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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars have thrived in incorporating the mind sciences into 
legal theory, particularly on two fronts.  Behavioral law and economics,1 
relying in part on the Nobel Prize winning roots of Prospect Theory,2 has 
made great strides in providing a realist critique of Law and Economics.3  
Implicit racial bias scholarship, emerging from the field of implicit 
social cognition, has successfully challenged the law’s purported race-
neutrality by showing that people automatically exhibit racially biased 
 
 1. Behavioral law and economics is the study of how cognitive biases or limitations 
predictably affect decision-makers’ behavior in ways that cause the behavior to deviate from what is 
economically beneficial.  More broadly, behavioral law and economics may be characterized as part 
of the broader innovation of considering empirical behavioral evidence in legal scholarship.  See 
generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Avishalom Tor, 
The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237 (2008); BEHAVIORAL 
LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics:  
A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999). 
 2. Prospect theory describes the psychology of decision-making as it relates to value 
judgments of monetary gains and losses.  It arose as a theoretical alternative to the rational choice 
assumptions underlying law and economics.  Prospect theory holds, among other things, that 
individuals “consider outcomes in terms of gains and losses from some reference point,” and that 
“losses loom larger than gains.”  PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KREIGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, 
DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 419 (2010).  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV., 237 
(1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCI. 1124 (1974).  Kahneman was the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 
2002.  The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002, 
NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ 
2002/.  See also George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 181 (1989); RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE D. ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:  STRATEGIES 
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).   
 3. As Richard Posner describes, “[t]he task of economics ... is to explore the implications of 
assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life . . . .”  RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003).  Law and economics therefore embraces this assumption and 
considers the various implications of it.  For more on law and economics, see HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS, vols. 1-2 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).  Law and economics has had a massive 
impact on legal scholarship.  As one commentator has surmised, “[r]elying on the rational-actor 
model, the economic approach has been able to reevaluate systematically one legal domain after 
another.”  See Tor, supra note 1, at 240. 
2
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attitudes.4  The prominence and rapid growth of these two fields of legal 
scholarship, however, has overshadowed the fact that, despite their 
social scientific similarities, scholars have largely failed to consider what 
happens when phenomena from the two areas collide.5  In particular, 
scholars have not investigated whether powerful implicit racial 
stereotypes may trump even well-established behavioral economic 
principles when decision-makers make risk allocation decisions.  
Without considering and empirically testing whether behavioral 
economic principles yield to racial stereotypes, legal scholars not only 
risk embracing an incomplete model of human behavior, but they also 
risk advocating policies that may actually reinforce people’s non-
conscious need to maintain social and racial inequality.  The interaction 
between behavioral economics and implicit social cognition must 
therefore be explored. 
Behavioral economic theory has been embraced as a sophisticated 
behavioral update to legal decision-making models.6  It has introduced 
an overwhelming array of evidence that, rather than following rational 
wealth maximizing principles as homo economicus (or rational wealth 
maximizers), people make decisions in predictably irrational ways.7  A 
 
 4. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality:  Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 363 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality]; 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) 
(introducing the concept of unconscious discrimination to the employment discrimination realm).  
See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007) [hereinafter Bagenstos, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law]; Jerry 
Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:  A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative 
Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral 
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:  Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 997, 1027 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1539 
(2005). 
 5. One social scientist has tested whether the hindsight bias operates in the context of 
stereotypes.  See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Second-Guessing the Jury:  Stereotypic and Hindsight 
Biases in Perceptions of Court Cases, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1112 (1990).  This study is 
discussed infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text. 
 6. See Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship:  A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).  See also Kent Greenfield, Using 
Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003) [hereinafter Guthrie, Prospect Theory]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
630 (1999); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 
(2006); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608 (1998) [hereinafter Korobkin, Status Quo Bias]. 
 7. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1; Guthrie, supra note 6; 
Jolls et al., supra note 1.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and 
3
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few of the more prominent examples of this legal scholarship include 
expositions of hindsight bias,8 anchoring effect,9 and the endowment 
effect,10 among others.11  These cognitive biases and heuristics12 
demonstrate that people are quite susceptible to situational influences, 
including whether outcome information is known (people overestimate 
the ex-ante likelihood of events occurring)13 and whether “anchor” 
amounts are given (people cannot ignore the effect of the anchor on their 
economic calculation).14  Each of these deviations from rationality has 
implications for legal theory designed to predict and shape human 
behavior, and scholars have celebrated the building of a more accurate 
model of decision-making.15   
But what if this model, despite its improvement on the law and 
economics paradigm, overlooks the interaction between economic 
decision-making and implicit racial biases?  One risk of a model that 
 
Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors]; Sunstein, 
supra note 1; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1. 
 8. See generally Rebecca L. Guilbault et al., A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias, 
26 BASIC AND APP. SOC. PSYCH. 103 (2004); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex 
Ante:  Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Susan J. LaBine & 
Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 
(1996); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 571 (1998) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Judging in Hindsight]. 
 9. See generally Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and 
Negotiation:  New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597 (2006); 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:  The Effects of 
Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999). 
 10. See generally Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004); Benjamin Cook, Method in Its Madness:  The 
Endowment Effect in an Analysis of Refugee Burden-Sharing and a Proposed Refugee Market, 19 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 333 (2004); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin, Endowment Effect]; James Robert Ward III, The 
Endowment Effect and the Empirical Case for Changing the Default Employment Contract from 
Termination “At-Will” to “For-Cause” Discharge, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 205 (2004). 
 11. Other phenomena include framing effects, affect heuristic, representativeness heuristic, 
status quo bias, and more.  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation:  A Psychological 
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000); Guthrie, Prospect Theory, supra note 6; Korobkin, Status 
Quo Bias, supra note 6; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6; Langevoort, supra note 6; E. J. McCaffery 
et al., Framing the Jury:  Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1341 (1995). 
 12. Cognitive biases are distortions and errors in decision-making.  Heuristics are essentially 
cognitive shortcuts.  See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 2; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6. 
 13. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight [not =] Foresight:  The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on 
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. 288 (1975) (first describing the effect). 
 14. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2. 
 15. These scholars have grappled deeply with many of the difficult questions that a new 
behavioral model brings.  See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1; 
Langevoort, supra note 6. 
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focuses too narrowly on cognitive biases, without considering racial 
context, is that it might propose legal responses to these cognitive biases 
that may work to further subordinate already subordinated groups.  This 
Article considers, and empirically tests, behavioral economic 
phenomena in light of implicit social cognition research.  It argues that 
an undiscovered piece of human “irrational” behavior is that it 
systematically yields to racial stereotypes, and employs an empirical 
study to test this argument.  The results of the study are mixed, but in 
some circumstances confirm the hypothesis that racial stereotypes are 
powerful enough to blunt economic irrationalities, and therefore function 
as what I call a “SuperBias”—a bias so powerful that it modifies even 
existing biases.  Building on these results, the Article proposes the 
creation of a stereotype competent model of behavioral law and 
economics.  
Consider a brief example of the way stereotype information may 
act to overcome the predictably irrational effects of the “hindsight bias.”  
Research on the hindsight bias shows consistently that people are unable 
to disregard known outcome information in making judgments of the 
likelihood of a certain event occurring.16  Thus, a juror in an attempted 
murder trial who knows that the victim survived an attack (as jurors 
would) will be likely to overestimate the likelihood that the victim 
would survive the attack.  And because “intent to kill” is a key element 
of the crime of attempted murder, jurors who underestimate the 
likelihood of the victim’s death may similarly underestimate the 
defendant’s level of intent in striving to cause death.  No matter how 
hard the judge tries to offset the effects of hindsight, jurors will 
overestimate the chances of the victim’s survival, and therefore may be 
more likely to acquit the defendant.  Now factor in implicit racial bias.  
In the same hypothetical attempted murder trial, if a young black male 
perpetrator harms the victim, jurors may be less likely to be influenced 
by the hindsight information (that the victim survived) because they are 
more influenced by the stereotype of the perpetrator—that he is an 
aggressive killer—than the hindsight information.17  Thus, hindsight bias 
will result in extra acquittals for white defendants, while racial 
stereotypes will counter the hindsight bias relating to black defendants.  
Legal interventions intended to counter hindsight bias could exacerbate 
the effects. 
 
 16. Fischoff, supra note 13.  
 17. This example is based upon the empirical study presented in section IV.  For previous 
research on stereotypes and the hindsight bias, see Bodenhausen, supra note 5.   
5
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This Article explores what happens when behavioral law and 
economics and implicit social cognition collide, and presents an 
empirical study designed to test the hypothesis that racial stereotypes 
overpower behavioral economic phenomena.  The Article is organized as 
follows.  Section II details behavioral law and economics as well as 
implicit social cognition.  It examines the social science basis of each 
field and explores the similar cognitive mechanics underlying them.   
Section III investigates what happens when race is introduced into 
economic decision-making and considers how racial stereotypes may 
specifically affect economic decisions already at risk of irrationality.  
Research has documented that economic decision-making is often 
discriminatory; new evidence suggests that these decisions may be 
predicted by implicit racial bias.  The emerging social cognition theory 
called System Justification Theory helps to explain why people may 
discriminate as part of an unconscious need to maintain the social and 
economic status quo.  This unconscious need may directly conflict with 
decision-makers’ other implicit motivations that drive supposedly race-
neutral cognitive errors described by behavioral economics. 
Building on these rationale for considering behavioral economics 
and implicit social cognition together, section IV presents the empirical 
study I conducted to test the hypothesis that implicit racial stereotypes 
can overpower economic-based cognitive biases.  Participants in the 
study read information (related to an attempted murder trial) that was 
designed to trigger both hindsight bias and anchoring effect.  The race of 
the defendant was varied.  It was hypothesized that when participants 
read about a black defendant, both hindsight bias (related to the 
likelihood of the victim dying) and anchoring effects (relating to 
minimum jail sentence) would be diminished significantly.  The results 
of the study confirmed the first hypothesis:  bucking hindsight bias, 
mock jurors were significantly more likely to believe that a crime victim 
would die when shot by a black perpetrator compared to a white 
perpetrator.  It was less clear, however, whether they would adhere to a 
given anchor when they were asked the minimum sentence for a crime 
and the crime had been committed by a black male.18 
Section V considers the results of the empirical study in light of 
behavioral law and economics literature as well as implicit bias 
scholarship.  It proposes that all discussions of behavioral economics 
must become race competent and provides a research agenda for future 
empirical study.  Section VI concludes. 
 
 18. See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
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II.  THE SHARED COGNITIVE BASIS OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS AND IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION 
Both behavioral law and economics and implicit social cognition 
have revolutionized legal theory by providing behavioral updates that 
allow scholars to more accurately understand human behavior and 
decision-making.19  Behavioral law and economics has modernized legal 
scholarship by demonstrating that in a variety of situations, human 
actors make decisions in ways that consistently deviate from what 
rational economic actors would do.20  Implicit social cognition has 
refreshed scholarship on inequality in the law by providing scientific 
evidence that people unconsciously and heavily rely on stereotypes in 
decision-making.21 This section explores the fundamentals of behavioral 
economics and implicit social cognition and argues that their shared 
focus on human decision-making, automatic cognitive processes, and 
working memory necessitates exploring the intersection of the two 
fields. 
A. The Contributions and Mechanics of Behavioral Law and 
Economics 
Behavioral law and economics has led the way in developing a 
more accurate model of the human mind.22  Prior to its introduction, the 
dominance of the law and economics model had yet to be balanced by 
knowledge of the way people think and make decisions.  Instead, legal 
decision-making models assumed that people would always make 
decisions that are consistent with their rational (profit seeking) self-
interest.23  With the development of prospect theory24 by psychologists 
such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and other research on 
 
 19. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006); Kang, supra note 4; Krieger, supra note 4. 
 20. Jolls et al., supra note 1; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1. 
 21. See generally Kang, supra note 4; Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 4; 
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 4; Kang & Banaji, supra note 4. 
 22. See generally Jolls et al., supra note 1; Sunstein, supra note 1. 
 23. See generally Posner, supra note 3; HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3; 
SHAVELL, supra note 3. 
 24. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability:  A Judgment of 
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972); Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, 
supra note 2.  See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability:  A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Causal Schemata in Judgments Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, 1 PROGRESS IN 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 49 (Martin Fishbein ed., 1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the 
Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105 (1971). 
7
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cognitive biases and heuristics, legal scholars began to wonder whether 
law and economics’ assumptions about human behavior might fail to 
understand the way people actually make decisions.25  These scholars 
began a behavioral revolution in legal scholarship that eventually crafted 
a behavioral roadmap from which exceptions to law and economics’ 
“homo economicus” model could be carved.26  The roadmap includes a 
large number of what economists typically term “irrational” decisions 
that people make—decisions that deviate from what economics predicts 
they should do.27  Notably, these decisions largely rely on cognitive 
biases or heuristics, which tend to rapidly and automatically affect the 
way people process information when making decisions. 
The dominance of law and economics began well before the 
introduction of behavioral insights into legal theory.28  Simply put, law 
and economics predicts that in all decisions relevant to law, people will 
act in their economic self-interest.  A simple economic game called the 
Ultimatum Game helps explain this principle as well as its limitations.29  
In the Ultimatum Game, a person (“the first mover”) is given an amount 
of money (frequently ten dollars) and paired with a partner (“the second 
mover”).30  The first mover is told to make an offer to share the ten 
dollars with the second mover.31  If the second mover accepts the offer, 
both parties keep their share of the money.32  If the second mover rejects 
the offer, both parties walk away with nothing.33  The game merges the 
 
 25. Notably, it took more than a decade for legal scholars to react to the groundbreaking 
findings of Kahneman, Tversky, and others. 
 26. Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler’s 1998 article is often recognized as being one of the 
groundbreaking articles in this area.  See Jolls et al., supra note 1.  Other early articles were 
similarly visionary.  See, e.g., Rachlinski, Judging in Hindsight, supra note 8; Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 1. 
 27. Some scholars have described these deviations as being comprised of bounded rationality, 
bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower.  See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1476. Jolls and her 
colleagues describe bounded rationality as the fact that “human cognitive abilities are not infinite.  
We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories.”  Id. at 1477. 
 28. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2003); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); SHAVELL, supra note 3. 
 29. See generally G. E. Bolton, A Comparative Model of Bargaining:  Theory and Evidence, 
81 AM. ECON. REV. 1096 (1991); Werner Güth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum 
Bargaining, 3 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982); B.J. Ruffle, More is Better, but Fair is Fair:  
Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, 23 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV. 247 (1998). 
 30. Guth et al., supra note 29, at 371; Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1489-90; Daniel Kahneman 
et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S288-89 (1986). 
 31. Kahneman et al., supra note 30, at S288. 
 32. For example, if the first mover offers one dollar, and the second mover accepts the offer, 
the first mover keeps nine dollars and the second mover keeps one dollar. 
 33. Kahneman et al., supra note 30, at S289. 
8
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notion of economic self-interest with psychological reality.  Economic 
theory predicts that the first mover should offer one cent (the least 
amount possible), because the second mover would be better off with 
one cent than with nothing (and a rational economic actor would choose 
a penny over nothing).34  Yet economic theory fails to predict the way 
ultimatum game participants act.  First movers who offer small amounts 
are overwhelmingly rejected by their second moving partners, indicating 
that many people would rather get nothing than participate in an unfair 
allocation of funds.35  First movers can predict this, too, which is why 
rather than offering a penny, most first movers offer several dollars to 
the second movers.36 
Similar to the first and second movers’ behavior in the ultimatum 
game, people deviate from other economically rational decisions in 
many ways.37  These deviations often turn out to be systematic, such that 
in certain types of decisions, people will regularly choose a less 
economically rational decision over a more rational decision.38  The 
following subsections explain the mechanics and implications of three 
behavioral phenomena in which people make decisions in flawed and 
inefficient ways:  the hindsight bias, anchoring effect, and endowment 
effect.39 
1. The Hindsight Bias 
The hindsight bias is the behavioral phenomena with the most legal 
history.  This particular bias, discovered by psychologist Boris 
Fischhoff, holds that when people know outcome information (how a 
story ends, for example), they won’t be able to disregard that 
information when making predictions about the likelihood that it would 
occur.40  Imagine, for example, that residents of Washington, D.C, who 
 
 34. Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1490. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (citing Guth et al., supra note 30, at 371-72, 375 tbls. 4-5; Kahneman et al., supra note 
30, at S291 tbl. 2). 
 37. See Jolls et al., supra note 1; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1; Sunstein, supra note 1.  See 
also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available?  Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1295 (2003) (examining the role of social forces on behavioral economic phenomena). 
 38. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 2 (2003); Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder, The Behavioral Foundations of Economic 
Theory, 59 J. BUS. S181, S181 (1986); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6. 
 39. These effects are well known examples.  There are, of course, a large number of cognitive 
biases and heuristics relevant to behavioral economics, including framing effect, confirmation bias, 
status quo bias, availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic, optimism bias, overconfidence 
effect, and more.   I do not specifically consider most of these principles in this article.  
 40. Fischhoff, supra note 13, at 292. 
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suffered a small earthquake in early July 2010 (the first in more than 
seventy years), were asked in September 2010 to estimate the statistical 
likelihood that an earthquake would hit Washington, D.C. in the fall of 
2011.  The chances of this occurrence are ridiculously small.  Yet one 
can imagine (and the hindsight bias predicts) that D.C. residents, unable 
to forget that an earthquake did in fact strike the area, would 
overestimate their predictions.41  In the legal system, the most popular 
discussion of hindsight bias is its effect on tort liability decisions.42  
Because hindsight bias will make the unfortunate outcome in most tort 
cases seem more inevitable than it actually was, there is concern that 
hindsight bias will irrationally lead to unjustified tort judgments against 
defendants.43 
Psychologists have conducted a range of research on why people 
harbor the hindsight bias.  One of the most empirically supported 
explanations posits that “learning an outcome alters what people believe 
about the world in ways that make the known outcome seem 
inevitable.”44  A related account explains that this inevitability might be 
an adaptive feature related to self-esteem such that it enables people to 
 
 41. For a variety of examples of the hindsight bias in action, see Jeffry J. Rachlinski, Judging 
in Hindsight, supra note 8.  See also Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 8. 
 42. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business 
Judgment Rule:  Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994); Kimberly Eberwine, 
Hindsight Bias and the Subsequent Remedial Measures Rule:  Fixing the Feasibility Exception, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633 (2005); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive 
Damages Awards:  Reply to Richard Lempert, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 987 (2002); Richard Lempert, 
Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 
DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999); Philip G. Peters, Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability:  Avoiding 
Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277 (1999).  Hindsight bias has also been discussed in a 
variety of non-tort related areas.  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-
the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2004); Mitu Gulati et 
al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773 (2004); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 715 
(2003); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious:  Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006); Gregory N. Mandel, 
Another Missed Opportunity:  The Supreme Court’s Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat 
Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323 (2008); Adam Powell, KSR 
Fallout:  Questions of Law Based on Findings of Fact and the Continuing Problem of Hindsight 
Bias, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 241 (2004); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight 
Versus Judging Liability in Hindsight:  The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813 (1999); Randall 
W. Roth, Hindsight Bias and the Curse of Knowledge:  Forewarned is Forearmed, 139 A.B.A. 
TRUST & INVESTMENTS 30 (2010);  Jun Wu, Rewinding Time:  Advances in Mitigating Hindsight 
Bias in Patent Obviousness Analysis, 97 KY. L. J. 565 (2008). 
 43. Rachlinski, Judging in Hindsight, supra note 8, at 574. 
 44. Jeffrey Rachlinski calls this the “cognitive” theory of hindsight bias.  Id. at 582. 
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“appear intelligent, knowledgeable, or perspicacious.”45 Other 
explanations of hindsight bias focus on how the reconstructive nature of 
human memory allows the mind to adapt outcome information into 
previously different cognitive understandings of a situation.46  Perhaps 
the point of greatest agreement among researchers is that the hindsight 
bias is automatic and non-conscious.  That is, it operates even without 
the awareness of the person influenced by it.47  As with many other 
cognitive biases, it is this powerful non-conscious reaction that makes 
the hindsight bias difficult to alter or resist.  
Legal scholars have struggled with what to do (or not do) about the 
hindsight bias.  Some areas of law, such as corporate law, recognize the 
potential danger of hindsight bias and account for it.  Under Delaware 
(and other) corporate law, for example, corporate directors are protected 
from liability by the business judgment rule.48  This rule creates a very 
high standard for holding a board liable for a bad decision.  Rather than 
allowing shareholders to recover against corporate boards for decisions 
that turn out to be ill advised (or even stupid), corporate law recognizes 
that judges and jurors might be unduly influenced by hindsight bias and 
 
 45. Ulrich Hoffrage & Ralph Hertwig, Hindsight Bias:  A Price Worth Paying for Fast and 
Frugal Memory, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 191, 194 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. 
eds., 1999). 
 46. Id. at 201.  As I have explored elsewhere, there is a strong relationship between memory 
errors and implicit racial bias.  See generally Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 4.  
For an overview of the three most prominent models seeking to explain hindsight bias, see Hartmut 
Blank & Steffan Netsler, Cognitive Process Models of Hindsight Bias, 25 SOC. COGNITION 132 
(2007). 
 47. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 561, 567 (1997) (noting that hindsight bias is “cognitive rather than motivational”).  
See also Blank & Nestler, supra note 46, at 136.  According to Blank and Nestler, outcome 
information “leads to automatic updating of the knowledge base.  Specifically, by unconscious 
associative inference, some of the unknown cue values or cue values pointing in the wrong direction 
. . . are probabilistically replaced with ‘fitting’ values.”  Id.  Blank and Nestler describe two of the 
three leading explanations of hindsight bias as those that consider hindsight bias to be part of an 
“associative system that operates quickly, automatically, and effortlessly. . . .” Id. at 139.  The third 
possible explanation is considered to involve “the conscious application of propositional rules,” but 
the authors note that automatic processes “may at least partly be involved.”  Id.    
 48. See generally Kamin v. Am. Exp. Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Smith v. Van 
Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 925 A.2d 
695 n.54 (Del. 2009); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968).  It is interesting to note 
that the business judgment rule was established before the hindsight bias was officially discovered 
and named by Fischhoff, supra note 13.  This fact does not mean, however, that the hindsight bias 
was irrelevant to the establishment of the rule.  Unlike many other biases, hindsight bias is quite 
intuitive and easy to conceptualize.  Consider the popular phrase, for example, “Monday morning 
quarterback,” which essentially refers to the hindsight bias.   
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erroneously grant recovery to shareholders.49  It thus holds forth a 
heightened standard under which proof of a negligent decision by the 
board is insufficient for liability.   
Other areas of law have failed or declined to alter standards based 
on evidence of the hindsight bias.  Tort law, for example, does not 
heighten standards because of the danger of extra liability imposed on 
defendants.50  As Jeffrey Rachlinski argues, however, shifting laws may 
not always be the best response.51  In the case of tort law, although the 
hindsight bias may essentially shift liability from a negligence standard 
to a strict liability standard (because even a non-negligent decision will 
seem negligent in hindsight), so long as the public knows such a shift 
has occurred, they may take commensurate steps to protect against 
liability.52  Similarly, criminal law has yet to make adjustments for 
hindsight bias.  In the case of attempted murder, for example, the risk 
remains that defendants will be disproportionately acquitted because the 
outcome information (that the victim did not die) lessens judgments of 
the defendant’s intent to kill.  This example will be considered in more 
detail in the context of the collision of implicit racial bias and behavioral 
economics. 
2. The Anchoring Effect 
Anchoring effect describes the phenomenon whereby people are 
influenced by uninformative numbers.53  When people are asked to make 
a decision that requires a numerical judgment or estimate, even random 
numbers presented to those people have been shown to impact their 
ultimate answers.54  A famous study on anchoring effects conducted by 
Tversky and Kahneman asked study participants whether the percentage 
of African nations in the United Nations was greater than an arbitrary 
number (e.g., either 10% or 65%).55  Participants were then asked to 
 
 49. Rachlinksi, Judging in Hindsight, supra note 8, at 619-23.  According to Jolls and 
colleagues, as well as Rachlinski, patent law also provides some protection against hindsight biasing 
in that it requires patent courts to look at secondary considerations in determining whether an 
invention was “nonobvious” at the time of invention.  Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1526; Rachlinski, 
Judging in Hindsight, supra note 8, at 613-15.   
 50. See Rachlinksi, Judging in Hindsight, supra note 8, at 596. 
 51. Id. at 597-98.  
 52. Id. at 598-600.  
 53. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 2, at 1125.  Anchoring 
effect is also referred to as “anchoring and adjustment effect.”   
 54. Id. 
 55. Participants were aware that the anchors were arbitrary, as they were derived when the 
participants spun a “wheel of fortune.”  Id. at 1128.  The researchers had rigged the results of the 
12
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estimate the actual percentage.  The researchers found that participants 
were heavily influenced by the anchor information.  Participants in the 
low anchor category estimated that the percentage of African nations in 
the United Nations was 25%, compared to participants in the high 
anchor category, who estimated the number at 45%.56   As Thomas 
Mussweiler and his colleagues describe, anchoring effects have been 
shown to be “a truly ubiquitous phenomenon that has been observed in a 
broad array of different judgmental domains.”57  Hence, anchoring 
effects have been found not only in frequency estimates, but also in 
medical decision-making and in legal decision-making.58 
Anchoring effects are caused by the increased accessibility of 
information related to an anchor.59  When people see an anchor, they 
first quickly evaluate whether it might be the correct response.60  As part 
of this process, people rely on their memories to recall instances that 
might confirm the truth (or prove the untruth) of the anchor.61  Once 
information relating to the response is recalled, people make adjustments 
to the anchor in order to make a decision.62  This process of adjusting the 
 
“wheel” such that half of the participants would see the low (10%) anchor and half would see the 
high (65%) anchor.  Id.  The random selection of anchors helps demonstrate that anchoring effects 
occur even when the anchor values are clearly uninformative or even extreme.  Thomas Mussweiler 
et al., Overcoming the Inevitable Anchoring Effect:  Considering the Opposite Compensates for 
Selective Accessibility, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1142, 1143 (2000).  In one study 
by Strack and Mussweiler, participants asked to estimate the age of Mahatma Gandhi were 
influenced by an unreasonably high anchor value of 140 years.  Id. (citing F. Strack & Thomas 
Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:  Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (1997)).  
 56. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 2, at 1128.  
 57. Mussweiler et al., supra note 55, at 1142 (noting that the anchoring effect has “clear 
practical relevance for many decisions in real-world settings”). 
 58. See generally Noel T. Brewer, The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on the Judgments and 
Choices of Doctors and Patients, 27 MED. DECISION MAKING 203 (2007); Birte Englich et al., 
Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences:  The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial 
Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188 (2006) [hereinafter Englich et al., 
Playing Dice]. 
 59. Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic:  Why the 
Adjustments are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311 (2006).  Additional research on anchoring 
effects have demonstrated that anchors are not just a product of insufficient adjustment, but also of 
people’s willingness to stop adjusting once their estimates enter a range of plausible responses.  Id. 
at 316. 
 60. Id. at 312.  
 61. The importance of memory in anchoring effects raises the issue of whether implicit racial 
biases in memory processes (including storage and retrieval) may introduce implicit racial biases 
into anchoring effects.  For more on implicit memory biases, see Levinson, Forgotten Racial 
Equality, supra note 4.  
 62.  Epley & Gilovich, supra note 59, at 312. 
13
Levinson: SuperBias
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
10- LEVINSON_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:39 PM 
604 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:591 
anchor to a more correct result leads participants to biased results.63  
Because people are cognitively focused on comparing the anchor to the 
truth, rather than simply evaluating the truth without outside influence, 
they rely too much on information related to the anchor and the 
anchoring effect (and corresponding lack of sufficient adjustment) 
asserts itself.64   
Consider, for example, criminal sentences.  If people are asked 
whether the minimum jail sentence for attempted murder is greater or 
less than two years, they will search their memories for information 
relating to sentence length.  If the idea that sentences for violent crimes 
are too short is a prevalent one in society, this information may become 
particularly salient.  If, however, people are asked whether the minimum 
jail sentence is greater or less than 100 years, information in which an 
overly punitive government cracks down on crime may become salient.  
When these people are next asked to identify the exact length of the 
minimum sentence for attempted murder, one could predict that the low 
(2 year) or high (100 year) anchor they were exposed to will exert 
influence on their cognitive process and thus on their final judgment.65   
In legal scholarship, a significant amount of attention has focused 
on the power of anchoring effects in the tort litigation context.66  Much 
of this attention has been empirical in nature and indicates that jurors 
cannot help but be affected by the amounts requested by attorneys.67  A 
project by John Malouff and Nicola Schutte, for example, examined how 
mock jurors responded to plaintiff’s request for damages depending 
upon whether the request was for $100,000 or $500,000.68  The results of 
the study showed that the anchors were powerful; although the cases 
were identical, participants in the $100,000 group awarded $90,000 on 
average while participants in the $500,000 group awarded $300,000 on 
 
 63. Id.   
 64. Strack & Mussweiler, supra note 55. 
 65. The effect of even randomly generated sentencing anchors has been confirmed in 
empirical studies.  See Englich et al., Playing Dice, supra note 58, at 197 (finding that even when 
prosecutor and judge participants generated anchors randomly by throwing dice, they were still 
influenced by anchoring effect).   
 66. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbenolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:  
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999). 
 67. See generally John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes:  Effects of 
Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 
(1989). 
 68. See id. at 493.  See also Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases:  Effects of 
Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
445, 463 (1999) (finding strong anchoring effects in mock juror decisions). 
14
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average.69  A similar study on anchoring in punitive damages by Jennifer 
Robbenolt and Christina Studebaker found that mock jurors displayed 
anchoring effects in response to caps on punitive damages, both in 
increasing and decreasing award amounts.70  Other work on anchoring 
has focused on the influence of anchoring on settlement decisions.  In 
two studies by Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, the researchers 
found that mock parties to a litigation would be more likely to settle if 
the final settlement offer they received was much higher than an original 
anchor offer.71  This finding occurred even though the final offers were 
identical, highlighting the influence of the original anchor offer.  Other 
legal scholarship has found anchoring effects on mock-juries in criminal 
sentencing72 and has even shown that judges display anchoring effects in 
making decisions.73   
Commentators have yet to agree on the best way to respond to 
anchoring effects.74  One seemingly logical response to anchoring effects 
would be to minimize either exposure to the anchoring information at all 
or shift the decision away from the same unit of measurement as the 
anchor.75  For example, Michael Kang has suggested, in the context of 
punitive damage caps, that one might avoid telling jurors altogether 
 
 69. Malouff & Schutte, supra note 67, at 495. 
 70. See Robbenolt & Studebaker, supra note 9, at 364. 
 71. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1101 (citing Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, 
Opening Offers and Out of Court Settlement:  A Little Moderation Might Not Go a Long Way, 10 
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 1 (1994); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to 
Litigation Settlement:  An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 139-42 (1994)). 
 72. See, e.g., Englich et al., Playing Dice, supra note 58.  Other empirical studies of 
anchoring effects have been conducted in related fields.  See, e.g., Brewer et al., supra note 58. 
 73. See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 
(2001); Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty:  Anchoring in the 
Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535 (2001) (using trial judges as study participants); 
Birte Englich et al., The Last Word in Court—A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense, 29 LAW & 
HUM BEHAV. 705 (2005). Englich et al., Playing Dice, supra note 58.  See also Birte Englich, Blind 
or Biased?  Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom Based on Given 
Numerical Representations, 28 LAW & POL’Y 497 (2006). 
 74. In fact, scholars disagree about the way to respond generally to behavior that deviates 
from economic rationality.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard S. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism is not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2003) (claiming that “libertarian 
paternalists should attempt to steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions without 
eliminating freedom of choice”); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); 
Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU 
L. REV. 905; Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 
(2005). 
 75. Note that with the anchoring effect, hindsight bias, and endowment effect, “debiasing” is 
nearly impossible, and can sometimes backfire.  See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 2, at 272, 276.  
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about the punitive damages cap.76  Yet, as critics have asserted, it is 
difficult to generate examples in which anchors are altogether 
eliminated; not using anchors risks that jurors will bring in less 
predictable anchors from other contexts.77  Shifting the nature of the 
decision away from anchor susceptible numbers also has potential for 
avoiding anchoring effects.  For example, if juries are likely to be 
susceptible to dollar value anchors when making decisions on a scale of 
dollar values, why not have them make a decision, as Cass Sunstein and 
colleagues suggest, on a scale of punishment ratings or rankings.78  This 
scale could then be later converted to a dollar scale.  Such a response 
might work if an anchor-proof scale could be developed with a 
meaningful conversion ratio.  Yet another response to anchoring 
involves holding the source of the anchoring responsible for the 
misleading effects that the anchors generate.  Korobkin and Ulen give 
the example of a sport utility vehicle manufacturer that chooses to 
advertise its automobiles travelling at excessive speeds on irregular 
terrain, yet simultaneously warns consumers that the product is not 
designed for such dangerous driving.79  The commentators suggest that 
because anchoring effect will lead consumers to insufficiently adjust to 
the anchor, manufacturers who choose to advertise in this way, despite 
otherwise adequate warnings provided to consumers, might be 
prohibited from receiving some or all liability protection when injuries 
arise from similar dangerous use of the automobiles.80  Another potential 
response to anchoring effect consists of doing nothing at all.  In the 
context of facilitating litigation settlements, for example, anchoring 
tends to increase the likelihood of settlement compared to a more 
economically efficient bargaining posture.  Thus, the settlement example 
is one where it might be best to let anchoring function on its own.81     
 
 76. Michael S. Kang, Don’t Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps:  The Merits of 
Nondisclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 (1999).  But see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining 
Punitive Damages:  Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 n.321 
(2002) (claiming that jurors might know about the cap anyway, and noting that because jurors’ prior 
knowledge could be subject to misconceptions, “blindfolding the jury may result in even greater 
variability.”). 
 77. See Robbennolt, supra note 76, at 103 n.321. 
 78. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 
YALE L.J. 2071, 2114 (1998). 
 79. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1102. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1101. 
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3. The Endowment Effect 
The endowment effect explains how people tend to over-value 
goods they own relative to goods they do not own.82  This effect is 
typically studied by creating a market for study participants and 
randomly distributing objects for the participants to buy and sell.  As 
studies of the endowment effect consistently show, participants who 
“own” objects require more to sell the objects than the buying 
participants are willing to pay.83  For example, Knetsch and Sinden gave 
half of their study participants (the sellers) a lottery ticket for a fifty 
dollar drawing.84  They then offered to buy the tickets from those 
participants for $3 and offered to sell identical lottery tickets to the other 
half of study participants (the buyers) for $3.85  Interestingly, very few of 
the sellers were willing to sell for $3, believing the value of the tickets to 
be more.86  Yet, very few buyers wanted to buy the tickets for $3, 
believing the value of the tickets to be less.87  The endowment effect is 
considered economically irrational because the inflation of perceived 
worth inhibits the transfer of goods at what might otherwise be a 
desirable price.   
The cause of the endowment effect has been debated, with most 
social scientists relying on prospect theory and the concept of loss 
aversion to explain it.88  “Loss aversion suggests that gaining an 
entitlement will be perceived as less significant than losing the same 
entitlement.”89  Thus, people will make greater efforts to avoid parting 
 
 82. See generally Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. AND ORG. 39 (1980).  See also Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Anomalies:  The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 
(1991). 
 83. Russell Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supra note 10, at 1229 (calling the endowment 
effect “undoubtedly the most significant single finding from behavioral economics for legal analysis 
to date.”). 
 84. Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supra note 10, at 1233 (citing Jack L. Knetsh & J. A. 
Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded:  Experimental Evidence of an 
Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1984)). 
 85. Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supra note 10, at 1233. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. For a broad review of potential causes of the endowment effect, see id. at 1242-55. 
 89. Id. at 1250 (citing Leaf Van Boven et al., Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners and 
Buyers:  Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 66, 66 
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1729, 1734-35 (1998); Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1484; Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg, 
Trading Wine:  On the Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and the Comparability of Consumer 
Goods, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 485, 486 (1998). 
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with owned objects than they will to gain similar un-owned objects.  But 
what explains loss aversion?  And are people consciously aware that 
they are making such economically inefficient decisions?  Research here 
is unclear, but one less controversial finding is that people do not have 
conscious awareness that the endowment effect is operating on them.90  
Some commentators point out the endowment effect may be driven by a 
need to avoid regret.91  Other scholars, however, believe that the 
endowment effect is based on the implicit need to maintain self-
esteem.92  Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji, for example, 
interpret studies relating to the immediacy of the endowment effect as 
deriving from people’s need to bolster implicit self-esteem.93  As soon as 
participants are given an object, their valuation of the object 
instantaneously increases.   
A study by George Lowenstein and Samuel Issacharoff explains the 
connection between self-esteem and the endowment effect.94  The 
researchers tested whether participants’ endowed object values would 
vary based on the self-esteem context.  Specifically, they investigated 
whether participants would place higher values on objects (mugs) they 
earned through exemplary performance compared to objects they earned 
randomly or through poor performance.95  The results of the study 
showed that participants who believed that they earned their mugs 
through exemplary performance attributed higher value to the mugs than 
those who received the other mugs for less exemplary (or random) 
reasons.96  Thus, a person might unconsciously inflate values of self-
related possessions without recognizing that the purpose of the inflation 
is to maintain a level of implicit confidence and self-respect.   
In the legal setting, the endowment effect is “relevant to scholars in 
every legal field.”97  Russell Korobkin describes a property law example 
 
 90. Gail Tom et al., Mere Exposure and the Endowment Effect on Consumer Decision 
Making, 141 J. OF PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2007). 
 91. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 2, at 427 (citing Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry:  
The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43). 
 92. Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:  Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 11 (1995). 
 93. Id.  
 94. See generally George Lowenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the 
Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157 (1994). 
 95. Id. at 159. 
 96. Id. at 160.  The researchers did not specifically test the causes of the effects they found.  
They did, however, attempt to show that participants did not simply value the mugs highly as either 
a reflection of enhanced mood, or as a way to keep them as a display for others to witness their 
successes (known as self-presentation).   
 97. Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supra note 10, at 1256. 
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in which the endowment effect is relevant to the way in which the 
government compensates landowners for takings.98  Because the 
endowment effect causes landowners to overvalue their properties, if the 
government chooses to bargain with landowners, it would pay a 
heightened amount due to the inflation generated by the owners’ 
endowment effect. 99  However, if the government unilaterally chooses a 
fair market value, it avoids the endowment effect.   
Scholars have disagreed about the extent to which the endowment 
effect should be considered in crafting law and policy responses to 
irrationality.  Much of this discussion has focused on the extent to which 
legislators should listen to the stated preferences of citizens when it is 
clear that the endowment effect will connect citizens’ preferences with 
the status quo.  Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that, due to the 
endowment effect’s predictable link to supporting the status quo, the 
government should disregard citizens’ stated desires when deciding 
whether or not to change the law.100  Korobkin disagrees, at least 
partially accepting the premise, but questioning the conclusion:  “even if 
this is true, what should govern policy if not the preferences of the 
governed?”101  Rachlinski and Cynthia Farina suggest somewhat of a 
middle ground solution.102  They acknowledge, like Korobkin, that rules 
should not ignore citizens, but recommend that they be crafted to at least 
somewhat reduce the long-term power of endowment effects.103  For 
example, legislation might have a sunset period or a mandated 
occasional legislative review of statutes might reduce the attachment that 
people give to the status quo.104   
The proliferation of behavioral law and economics scholarship has 
represented a major success in legal scholarship and has markedly 
improved the accuracy of decision focused legal theory.  However, it has 
not been the only mind-based revolution occurring in legal scholarship. 
 
 98. For a discussion of takings and the endowment effect, see id. at 1263-66. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1268 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 217, 234-35 (1993)). 
 101. Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supra note 10, at 1268. 
 102. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 605-06 (2002). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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B. The Mechanics and Contributions of Implicit Social Cognition 
After years of discussing how racial bias may be fraught with 
“unconscious” motives,105 legal scholars studying inequality were 
captivated by a social science revolution that began to scientifically 
confirm some of their long-held suspicions regarding societal racial 
bias.106  Relying on well-tested methodology, social scientists in the field 
of implicit social cognition developed a variety of ways to test whether 
people are indeed biased against members of certain groups in ways that 
often defy their own self-awareness.107  Although social psychologists 
had been uncovering the power of racial stereotypes for decades,108 the 
 
 105. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331-36 (1987). 
 106. See generally Kang, supra note 4; Krieger, supra note 4; Levinson, Forgotten Racial 
Equality, supra note 4; Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot:  Unconscious Stereotyping and the 
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005).  Many scholars have become excited by the 
role of implicit bias in employment discrimination suits.  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural 
Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, 
The Structural Turn]; Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 
56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolución!:  Recognizing Unconscious 
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2000); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias 
and Self-Critical Analysis:  The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity 
Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV.  C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481  (2005). 
 107. One interesting methodology is the study of “shooter bias.”  Shooter bias studies present 
participants with a video game in which men appear holding either guns or non-gun objects.  
Participants are asked to make “shoot” decisions as quickly as possible when they see a man 
holding a gun, and make “holster” decisions as quickly as possible when they see a man holding a 
non-gun object (such as a wallet or cell phone).  Each decision is made by pressing a designated 
button on a computer keyboard.  The researchers measure the reaction times and errors of the 
participants, and consistently find that participants shoot black perpetrators (with guns) faster than 
white perpetrators and holster their weapons more quickly when they see white bystanders (with 
wallets or cell phones) than when they see black bystanders.  Similarly, they make more shooting 
errors (shooting bystanders) when they see black bystanders compared to white bystanders.  See 
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma:  Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially 
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002) [hereinafter Correll et 
al., Police Officer’s Dilemma]; Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line:  Police Officers and 
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007) (studying 
shooter bias among police officers and finding that although police officers are faster and more 
accurate than community sample participants, their responses follow the same race-based trends); 
Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials and The Decision to Shoot:  The Role of Threat 
Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 122 (2006) (finding 
that shooter bias is related to the activation of fear in participants’ brains). 
 108. Allport and Postman conducted a famous study of racial stereotypes in the 1950s.  
GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 65-68 (1965).  Although the 
study was originally formulated to test how rumors circulated, it confirmed the powerful effect that 
racial stereotypes had on memory.  Specifically,  
participants viewed a picture of passengers on a streetcar (one of whom was Black). In 
the picture, one White passenger holds a razor blade and the Black passenger is empty-
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new implicit social cognition revolution has been particularly captivating 
because it has figured out how to test people’s automatic, uncontrolled 
associations.109  These are associations for which people possess little 
conscious awareness.110  Implicit racial biases, then, may be one way in 
which racial discrimination continues to be propagated, albeit covertly.  
Two specific examples of implicit racial bias—priming and implicit 
associations—exemplify the social scientific revolution, and have been 
particularly influential in legal scholarship on racial inequality. 
1. Racial Stereotype Priming 
Research on the cognitive phenomenon of priming shows how, 
once activated, racial and other stereotypes can have powerful 
unconscious effects on how people think and make decisions.  
Psychologists define priming as “the incidental activation of knowledge 
structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current 
situational context.”111  Priming is important in the legal setting because 
racial stereotypes can be activated in so many ways, and its effects are 
extremely difficult to track.  Yet studies both outside and inside the legal 
context demonstrate the power of activating racial stereotypes on 
decision-making.   
Racial and ethnic stereotypes can be activated easily.  A study by 
Daniel Gilbert and Gregory Hixon demonstrated that simply seeing a 
person from a stereotyped group can activate related stereotypes related 
 
handed.  After viewing the picture, participants were then asked to describe the picture to 
other participants who had not seen the picture.  As participants told and retold the story 
to others, the story changed.  After the story had been retold several times, some 
participants reported that the Black passenger—not the White passenger—held a razor 
blade.   The results of the study (which had originally focused on retelling accuracy) 
demonstrated a source attribution error—the razor blade possession shifted from one 
memory source (the White passenger) to another (the Black passenger). 
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 4, at 381. 
 109. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit 
Cognition:  The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1467 (1998) 
[hereinafter Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences].  See also Correll, Police Officer’s 
Dilemma, supra note 107 (testing reaction time and error rates in decisions to “shoot” perpetrators 
in a video-game like test); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 19, at 948-52. 
 110. There is some debate among psychologists over how much, if any, conscious awareness 
people have over their automatic, implicit cognitions.  See, e.g., Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. 
Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research:  Their Meanings and Use, 54 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 297, 303 (2003). 
 111. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior:  Direct Effects of Trait Construct 
and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 230 (1996). 
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to that group.112  Participants were asked to complete a videotaped word 
fragment task that was presented by a research assistant holding cue 
cards. 113  Half of the participants watched a video in which the research 
assistant was Asian, and half watched a video in which the research 
assistant was Caucasian.114  In each condition, the research assistant held 
the cards containing fragments that could be completed with either 
neutral words or with words stereotypic of Asians.115  For each fragment, 
participants completed as many words as possible in fifteen seconds.116  
The researchers found that simply seeing an Asian research assistant 
activated participants’ ethnic stereotypes.117  Participants who saw an 
Asian research assistant completed more stereotype-consistent words 
than participants who saw a Caucasian assistant.118   
Once primed, racial stereotypes can wreak havoc on decision-
making.  Laurie Rudman and Matthew Lee examined whether the 
activation of specific racial stereotypes (e.g. black aggression) can affect 
a person’s decision-making.119  In the study, the researchers primed the 
participants by playing either pop music or rap music.120   They 
hypothesized first, that simply hearing rap music would activate 
participants’ racial stereotypes, and second that these primed stereotypes 
would cause people to make more negative judgments about a black 
person.121  The results of the study confirmed these predictions.  
Participants who listened to the rap music not only had their stereotypes 
activated, but also rated a black person’s behavior as less intelligent and 
more hostile.122  It should be noted that asking participants about their 
own prejudices did not predict their judgments of the black person—a 
 
 112.  Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking:  Activation and 
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 509, 510 (1991). 
 113. Id.  As Gilbert and Hixon point out, “[s]tereotypes are forms of information and, as such, 
are thought to be stored in memory in a dormant state until they are activated for use.”  Id. at 509.  
 114. Id. at 510. 
 115. For example, participants saw the fragments:  “RI_E”, “POLI_E,” “S_ORT,” and “S_Y.” 
Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 511. 
 118. For example, they wrote:  RICE, POLITE, SHORT, AND SHY.  Id. at 510. 
 119. Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to 
Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133, 138-39 (2002).  
On average, participants listened to the music for thirteen minutes.  Id. at 135-36. 
 120. Participants were led to believe that they were participating in a marketing study.  Id. at 
136. 
 121. Id. at 135. 
 122. Id. at 139.  This result was compared to participants who read about and rated a white 
person.  Id.  
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finding that supports the theory that stereotypes can affect decision 
making even absent a person’s endorsement or awareness.123   
Empirical legal scholarship on priming has found it to be similarly 
problematic.124  Levinson and Danielle Young, for example, found that 
simply changing the skin tone of a perpetrator in a security camera photo 
affected the way participants judged ambiguous trial evidence.125  In a 
different study that tested a unique sample of actual trial judges, Jeffrey 
Rachlinski and his colleagues found that subliminally priming judge 
participants affected their decisions, and that such decisions were 
predicted by implicit biases.126  And in yet another study of priming and 
racial bias in the legal system, Young, Levinson, and Scott Sinnett found 
that presumption of innocence jury instructions primed mock jurors’ 
attention for black faces.127  These studies exemplify the impact that 
studies of implicit bias can hold for a legal understanding of inequality.  
Priming research, however, has been overshadowed in popularity by a 
ground-breaking measure called the Implicit Association Test. 
2. The Implicit Association Test 
The development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
revolutionized the way the world looked at and understood implicit 
bias.128  Perhaps because its web accessibility allows people to test (and 
attempt to overcome) their biases first hand, the IAT has served as a 
compelling and sometimes controversial symbol of implicit bias.129  The 
IAT:  
 
 123. Id. at 145. 
 124. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries:  
How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059 (2005) 
(finding that simply informing study participants that they were jurors in a criminal trial caused 
them to make harsher behavioral and mental state attributions of out-group members). 
 125. Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias:  Skin Tone, Implicit 
Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 337 (2010).  
Participants who were primed with a photo of a darker skin perpetrator later judged ambiguous 
evidence as tending to indicate more guilt compared to participants who saw a photo of a lighter 
skinned perpetrator.  Id. at 338.  
 126. Danielle Young, Justin D. Levinson & Scott Sinnett, Presumption of Innocence 
Instructions Biases Jurors (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 127. Id. at 9-10. 
 128. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 109; Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
ROBERT G. CROWDER 123 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 2001).  
 129. The debate surrounding the IAT has focused on a wide range of issues, including the 
meaning of reaction times (as well as the scoring those reaction times) to issues of predictive 
validity.  See Bagenstos, “Science” and Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 4; Adam Benforado & 
Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash:  The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights, 57 
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pairs an attitude object (such as a racial group) with an evaluative 
dimension (good or bad) and tests how response accuracy and speed 
indicate implicit and automatic attitudes and stereotypes.  Participants 
sit at a computer and are asked to pair an attitude object (for example, 
black or white, man or woman; fat or thin) with either an evaluative 
dimension (for example, good or bad) or an attribute dimension (for 
example, home or career, science or arts) by pressing a response key as 
quickly as they can.  For example, in one task, participants are told to 
quickly pair together pictures of African-American faces with positive 
words from the evaluative dimension.  In a second task, participants 
are obliged to pair African-American faces with negative words.  The 
difference in the speed at which the participants can perform the two 
tasks is interpreted as the strength of the attitude (or in the case of 
attributes, the strength of the stereotype).  For example, if participants 
perform the first task faster than the second task, they are showing 
implicitly positive attitudes toward blacks.  Similarly, if they perform 
tasks that oblige categorizing women with home faster than career, 
they are showing implicit sex stereotyping.130 
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald explain the way the 
IAT is interpreted:  “When highly associated targets and attributes share 
the same response key, participants tend to classify them quickly and 
easily, whereas when weakly associated targets and attributes share the 
same response key, participants tend to classify them more slowly and 
with greater difficulty.”131  Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore 
similarly describe the IAT’s methodology as relying on “well-practiced 
associations between objects and attributes.”132 
The IAT has become a particularly forceful symbol of implicit bias 
for legal scholars.133  There are two primary reasons for the compelling 
 
EMORY L.J. 1087 (2008); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter:  A Reply to 
Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2009); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, 
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1028, 1032-33 
(2006); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 
(2007). 
 130. Justin D. Levinson et al., Implicit Racial Bias:  A Social Science Overview, in IMPLICIT 
RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 8 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., forthcoming, 2012). 
 131. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic 
Attitudes:  Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803 (2001). 
 132. Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association 
Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 359 (2007). 
 133. Numerous scholars have discussed implicit bias and the IAT.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado 
& Jean Stefancic, Four Observations About Hate Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 365-66 
(2009) (suggesting that hate speech may lead to implicit bias); Alex Geisinger, Rethinking 
Profiling:  A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR. L. REV. 657, 658 (2007) 
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nature of the measure.  First, research has shown consistently that 
people’s implicit biases frequently diverge from their self-reported 
attitudes—a phenomenon known as dissociation.134  Thus, people who 
view themselves as having favorable attitudes towards certain groups 
may be surprised to learn that this explicit favorability is not reflected in 
that person’s implicit cognitions.   
Second, the IATs popularity among scholars as a symbol of 
inequality may be traced to its success in predicting the way people 
make decisions.  That is, the simple methodology of the IAT has shown 
how implicit bias leads to important real world consequences, ranging 
from doctor’s medical treatment decisions to human resource officers’ 
decisions whether or not to offer an interview to a job candidate.135  For 
example, medical researchers found that when asked to diagnose and 
treat a hypothetical patient (who was pictured as either black or white), 
emergency room doctors in Boston and Atlanta relied on their implicit 
racial biases.136  Doctors who showed more bias in the black-white IATs 
were more likely to offer a preferred heart treatment to a white patient 
 
(claiming that racial profiling relies on cognitive processes that harbor implicit biases); Tristin K. 
Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (2008) (considering the relational aspects of implicit bias in the workplace); 
Jonathan Kahn, Race, Genes, and Justice:  A Call to Reform the Presentation of Forensic DNA 
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 325, 373 (2008) (discussing the results of IATs 
and stating, “To the extent that such implicit race bias might already be present among average 
jurors, injecting race into the presentation of forensic DNA evidence presents a significant danger of 
tainting the proceedings with unfair prejudice.”); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 471, 479 (2008) (discussing implicit bias in the context of sexual orientation bias); 
Avital Mentovich & John T. Jost, The Ideological “Id”?  System Justification and the Unconscious 
Perpetuation of Inequality, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (2008) (considering Charles Lawrence’s 1987 
article on unconscious racism, supra note 105, in an updated scientific perspective); Michael B. 
Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 27, 42-46 (2009) (discussing implicit bias in the context of prisoners’ rights); Rigel C. Oliveri, 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and 
Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 74-77 (2009) (predicting that implicit bias leads to 
housing discrimination against illegal immigrants); Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, 
Michelle Obama:  A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination through the Lens 
of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2009) (considering race- and gender-based implicit bias 
in politics and in the workplace); Gregory S. Parks & Shayne E. Jones, “Nigger”:  A Critical Race 
Realist Analysis of the N-Word Within Hate Crimes Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1305 
(2008); Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done About 
It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 507 (2007) (noting that implicit bias may affect housing rentals 
more than employment decisions). 
 134. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 110, at 303; Kang, supra note 4, at 1513.  See also Laurie 
A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society:  The Nature, Causes, and 
Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 129, 133 (2004). 
 135. See Siri Carpenter, Buried Prejudice, 2008 SCI. AM. MIND 32. 
 136. Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias among Physicians and its Prediction of 
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007). 
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than a black patient.137  Similarly striking research emerged in Sweden, 
where Dan-Olof Rooth replied to hundreds of job postings by submitting 
resumes that differed only in the ethnicity revealed by the applicant’s 
name.138  Rooth measured which resumes elicited invitations to 
interview, and subsequently tracked down the individual human 
resources officers responsible for making the interviewing decisions.  
Without knowing the true purpose of the study, the human resources 
officers completed an IAT.  The researcher was able to measure the 
relationship between the officers’ IAT scores and their previous 
decisions of whether or not to interview a candidate.139  He found that 
the greater the human resources officers’ implicit bias, the more likely 
those officers were to extend an interview to a non-Arab candidate.140  
Other studies, including a meta-analysis of over 100 IATs, confirm that 
implicit bias on the IAT indeed predicts the way people make decisions 
in the real world.141 
Few IATs have been conducted in the legal setting, but the ones 
that tend to prove that implicit racial biases are powerful and have broad 
effects.142  A study by Levinson, Young, and Huajian Cai, for example, 
tested implicit associations relating to the presumption of innocence and 
found that people hold implicit associations between black and guilty.143  
Using an IAT created specifically to examine the implicit connections of 
the presumption of innocence, as well as a traditional IAT measuring 
implicit racial attitudes, the researchers also showed that IAT scores 
 
 137. Id. at 1231. 
 138.  Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring:  Real World Evidence 5 (Inst. for the 
Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2764, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=984432. 
 139. Id. at 11. 
 140. Id. at 17.  
 141. See generally Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit 
Association Test: III. Meta Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 
(2009). 
 142. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death 
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1542 (2004) (finding implicit racial bias among capital 
defense attorneys); Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White?  Measuring the Myth of 
Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEG STUD. 886, 912 ( 2010) (finding that implicit stereotypes about 
the ethnicity of successful litigators predicted judgments of litigator performance); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1195, 1197 
(2009) (finding that judges possess implicit biases favoring whites over blacks, and these biases 
sometimes predicted judge’s decisions). 
 143. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias:  The Guilty/ Not Guilty Implicit 
Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207 (2010). 
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predicted the way in which participants evaluated ambiguous trial 
evidence.144  
The research from implicit social cognition has shown repeatedly 
that when stereotypes are activated, concerning consequences often 
follow.  If, for example, racial stereotypes are powerful enough to affect 
hiring decisions, medical treatment judgments, and inequality in legal 
decision-making, then perhaps it would not be surprising if they were 
similarly strong enough to overpower behavioral economic principles.  
Yet it is not only the power of implicit racial stereotypes that might lead 
them to trump behavioral economic principles.  It is also the underlying 
cognitive similarities between implicit racial biases and behavioral 
economic principles.   
C. Sibling Relationship:  The Similarities of Behavioral Economics 
and Implicit Social Cognition 
Legal scholars have tended to analyze implicit social cognition and 
behavioral economics separately, and most scholars writing in these 
areas have focused on one, but not both fields.145  Yet, a select few 
commentators have recognized that the fields hold more similarities than 
differences.  Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein, for example, have noted 
that there are fundamental reasons for considering them together.146  
Jolls posits:  “[a]lthough implicit racial or other group-based bias is not 
conventionally grouped with other forms of bounded rationality within 
behavioral economics, the fit may be more natural than has typically 
been supposed.  Such implicit bias may often result from the way in 
 
 144. Id. at 206. 
 145. Christine Jolls and Jeffrey Rachlinski are two scholars who have written extensively in 
behavioral law and economics, but have also considered the effects of implicit racial bias.  See, e.g., 
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias, in BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF 
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 69 (Mitu Gulati & M. Yelnosky eds., 2007); Christine Jolls & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 
6; Jolls et al., supra note 1; Rachlinski, Judging in Hindsight, supra note 8; Rachlinski et al., supra 
note 142; Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information:  The Difficulty of 
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).  My research has primarily focused on 
implicit bias, but has also included discussions of cognitive biases and behavioral law and 
economics.  See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:  How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore 
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L.J. 1 (2005); Justin D. 
Levinson, Culture, Cognitions, and Legal Decision-Making, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND 
COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES 423-39 (R. Sorrentino & S. Tamaguchi eds., 2008); Justin D. 
Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts:  A Cultural Psychological 
Critique of Tort Law’s Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195, 
195 (2004) (highlighting cultural differences in cognitive biases); Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping 
Peng, Valuing Cultural Differences in Behavioral Economics, 4 ICFAI J. BEHAV. FIN. 32 (2007). 
 146. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6.  
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which the characteristic of race or other group membership operates as a 
sort of ‘heuristic’—a form of mental short-cut.”147  The suggestion that 
implicit bias be analyzed as a separate heuristic within behavioral 
economics is progressive because it recognizes the cognitive 
interconnectedness of the fields.  However, it overlooks the fact that 
implicit racial bias likely does not merely function as an independent 
bias.  Rather, it may play a key interactive role in blunting or modifying 
other behavioral economic phenomena in every situation in which race is 
a factor.148  
As Jolls and Sunstein suggest, research from the mind sciences 
shows that the cognitive mechanisms underlying implicit bias and 
behavioral economics are quite similar—a finding that would at 
minimum support an investigation of what happens when the two 
collide.149  This similarity derives from a few key facts relating to the 
ways in which both fields operate in analogous situational and cognitive 
domains.  First, and most importantly, they share automaticity as a core 
feature.  As Jolls and Sunstein note, “implicit bias—like many of the 
heuristics and biases emphasized elsewhere—tends to have an automatic 
character.”150  Recall, for example, that a hallmark of hindsight bias, like 
implicit racial bias, is that it is automatic and non-conscious.151  When 
outcome information is introduced, the human mind immediately reacts 
by revising the way the perceiver processes information about the past.  
In this sense, hindsight bias’ automaticity resembles racial priming, 
which operates with similar speed and efficiency.  When a racial 
stereotype becomes primed, it quickly begins to exert a strong influence 
over the way in which people perceive subsequent situations.152   
Second, both fields lean upon aspects of the human memory in 
decision-making.  Recall that anchoring effects rely partially on the 
 
 147. Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics 13 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959177. Jolls and Sunstein add:  “legal 
responses to implicit bias are illuminatingly analyzed in terms that bring such bias in direct contact 
with cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.”  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 973. 
 148. The investigation of implicit bias’ effects on behavioral economic phenomena should not 
be limited to just implicit racial bias.  In fact, all stereotypes, including but not limited to gender, 
ethnic, religion, sexual orientation, weight, and age, have the potential to modify behavioral 
economic phenomena.  
 149. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 973-75. 
 150. Id. at 973. 
 151. See supra note 109-10 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 111-22 and accompanying text.  Perhaps the biggest difference between 
the phenomena of hindsight bias and racial stereotype priming is that hindsight bias focuses on a 
specific situation for which outcome is known and priming focuses on the effect of a prime on a 
network of related decisions. 
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human memory in determining how far to adjust to an anchor.153  As 
Epley and Gilovich note, anchoring effects are produced by “enhanced 
accessibility of anchor-consistent information.”154  When a perceiver is 
exposed to an anchor, the mind immediately begins working to 
determine how far to adjust in order to reach the truth.  The cognitive 
bias arises when the anchor elicits a heavier load of anchor-consistent 
information from the memory than is actually representative for the 
relevant query.155  The perceiver therefore relies too heavily on the 
anchor and fails to adjust adequately.156  A similar phenomenon based 
on recall bias in the human memory occurs with implicit racial bias.157  
Specifically, during deliberations of a trial in which racial stereotypes 
are present, information processing problems begin to arise.158  Although 
the juror’s mind attempts to perfectly retrieve the information from trial, 
as with the anchoring effect the mind cannot help but retrieve biased 
information.  A study by Levinson found, for example, that mock jurors 
remember and misremember facts from a criminal assault case in ways 
consistent with racial stereotypes of black aggression.159  As Levinson 
noted, these “memory errors are pervasive, meaningful, and hard to 
correct.”160  Thus, the human memory becomes compromised in the 
presence of racial stereotypes much as anchor-consistent information 
clouds adjustment efforts. 
Third, the two fields rely on similar motivating factors that drive 
the cognitive errors themselves.  The endowment effect, for example, is 
driven by various factors related to loss aversion, a key motivator of 
which is the perceiver’s implicit need for self-esteem.161  When 
presented with an opportunity to sell an item that the perceiver 
possesses, the implicit need for self-esteem exerts itself by increasing the 
perceived value of the item.  Similarly, hindsight bias has been 
explained with regard to the perceiver’s need to increase self-esteem.  
But what connects implicit racial bias to implicit self-esteem?  As 
section III introduces, System Justification Theory has hypothesized, 
among other things, that higher status group members’ desire to oppose 
 
 153. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 154. Epley & Gilovich, supra note 59, at 312. 
 155. Id. at 311-12. 
 156. Id. at 312. 
 157. See generally Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 4. 
 158. Id. at 373-81. 
 159. Id. at 398-404.  
 160. Id. at 406. 
 161. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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equality is related to increased self-esteem.162  In both fields, then, 
people’s irrational or biased decisions can be traced at least partially to 
their need to maintain self-esteem. 
The underlying similarities between behavioral economic and 
implicit bias are therefore salient.  It should not be surprising, then, if 
similar situations can trigger their automatic biasing effects.  Yet 
scholars have yet to consider what happens when behavioral economic 
principles and racial stereotypes collide.  Perhaps one explanation is that 
scholars have tended to overlook implicit bias when considering how 
and why economic discrimination functions.  The next section considers 
this possibility, and presents a theoretical approach that can explain why 
implicit bias must be considered in all economic decision-making 
contexts. 
III.  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND THE IMPLICIT NEED TO SUBORDINATE 
As section II demonstrated, the underlying similarities of 
behavioral economics and implicit social cognition necessitate an 
investigation of what happens when the two fields collide.  Beyond these 
similarities, however, it is possible to add theoretical depth in predicting 
how implicit racial biases might disrupt economic biases in decision-
making.  This section considers the possibility that implicit bias may 
disrupt economic efficiency and interfere with behavioral economic 
phenomena because people act on an unconscious need to maintain the 
social and economic status quo.  Research suggests that this unconscious 
need, which may lead to the subordination of already disadvantaged 
groups, may exist as a way to maintain implicit self-esteem for members 
of well-positioned groups.  As a result, the behavioral economic 
deviations from rationality displayed by individual actors may yield to 
more powerful socio-hierarchical needs that not only function as part of 
the self (as behavioral economic principles do in maintaining implicit 
self-esteem, for example), but also as part of a linked collective (albeit 
unconscious) effort to maintain social dominance.  
Empirical studies have long demonstrated that people tend to 
discriminate against out-group members in real world economic 
decision-making domains, ranging from pricing of automobiles, to 
taxicab tipping, to the setting of bail in criminal trials.  Similarly, in the 
economic laboratory setting, “game” studies such as trust games163 and 
 
 162. System Justification Theory is discussed infra Section III.A. 
 163. Trust games are those in which a participant is given a certain amount of money and is 
given the chance to either keep that amount of money, or, alternatively, transfer the money (times 
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dictator games164 show that when people interact with members of out-
groups, they shift resources away from out-group members.165  But why?  
First, like with other cognitive biases, economics has a difficult time 
explaining this; economic racial discrimination is irrational.  Second, 
although some commentators have explained economically 
discriminatory behavior as resulting from people’s conscious and 
intentional desire to discriminate, economic discrimination may be better 
explained through an implicit bias lens.  That is, people may make 
economically discriminatory decisions because of an implicit need to 
maintain economic and social hierarchies by reinforcing the status quo.  
Such an implicit need could be capable of producing a powerful 
economic bias that wreaks discriminatory havoc. 
The contention that people harbor an implicit need to maintain 
racial and economic hierarchies is partially supported by System 
Justification Theory, which explains why people discriminate in a 
manner that tends to perpetuate the status quo.166  System Justification 
Theory shows that discrimination has both conscious and unconscious 
roots, and that decision making may be occurring as an implicit status 
quo maintenance tool.167  In proposing that implicit racial bias functions 
to disrupt economic activity, rational or irrational, in discriminatory 
 
some multiple, usually 2 or 3) to a partner.  The partner then has the choice of giving some of the 
money back to the participant.  
 164. Dictator games are similar to ultimatum games, except that the partner, or second mover, 
has no opportunity to allocate money.  Thus, the only decision made is the initial decision of the 
participant. 
 165. See, e.g., Catherine C. Eckel & Rick K. Wilson, Conditional Trust:  Sex, Race and Facial 
Expressions in a Trust Game (2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~rkw/RKW_FOLDER/PC_2002_RKW.pdf; Catherine C. Eckel & Ragan 
Petrie, Face Value, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2011).  These studies are discussed infra notes 
201-14 and accompanying text. 
 166. See generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:  
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119 (2006).  Avital 
Mentovich & John T. Jost, supra note 133.  John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification 
Theory:  Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 6 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 881 (2004) [hereinafter Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory]; Laurie A. 
Rudman et al., Minority Members’ Implicit Attitudes:  Automatic Ingroup Bias as a Function of 
Group Status, 20 SOC. COGNITION 294, 294 (2002); John T. Jost et al., Non-Conscious Forms of 
System Justification:  Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 586 (2002); John T. Jost et al., Social Inequality and the Reduction 
of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System:  Evidence of Enhanced System Justification 
Among the Disadvantaged, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13 (2003); Aaron C. Kay & John T. Jost, 
Complementary Justice:  Effects of “Poor but Happy” and “Poor But Honest” Stereotype 
Exemplars on System Justification and Implicit Activation of the Justice Motive, 85 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 823 (2003). 
 167. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory, supra note 166, at 888. 
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ways, this section first explains System Justification Theory and 
empirical studies that confirm how it functions.  It then presents studies 
documenting a range of continued economic discrimination, and notes 
that commentators have tended to rely largely on conscious factors to 
explain this discrimination.  It next uses the studies as a basis to consider 
how implicit racial bias may trump behavioral economic phenomena, 
and sets the stage for section IV’s empirical study by revisiting specific 
economic-based cognitive biases in light of a SuperBias. 
A. System Justification Theory and Status Quo Maintenance 
System Justification Theory (SJT) posits that, despite people’s (self 
reported) explicit preferences, they sometimes act automatically and 
unconsciously to maintain a structure of social order.168  Specifically, 
SJT posits that people act to subordinate low-status groups because, 
among other things, maintaining social and racial hierarchies strengthens 
high-status group members’ self-esteem and helps them create a 
“rationalization of the status quo.”169  As this section will show, SJT 
(and implicit bias generally) can interfere both with economic rationality 
and with the economical “irrationality” characterized by behavioral 
economics.  In addition, SJT offers evidence that explains why even 
members of low-status groups may unconsciously act against their own 
self-interest by choosing to accept (implicitly, at least) some aspects of 
the discrimination and failing to oppose regimes that would improve the 
status quo.  Specifically, as Jon Jost and his colleagues explain, 
“research repeatedly shows that low-income groups are scarcely more 
likely than high-income groups to support [policies that would help] 
them.”170  
Studies by SJT researchers have begun to shed light on a 
psychological reason underlying why high status groups choose to 
oppose economic and racial equality.  Jon Jost and E.P. Thompson tested 
the relationship between opposition to equality and self related 
 
 168. Portions of this paragraph, including footnotes are largely a verbatim description of 
System Justification Theory presented in Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 4, at 362-
63.  See Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory, supra note 166, at 912.  System 
Justification Theory evidence shows, for example, that many members of minority groups harbor 
negative stereotypes about their own groups.  Id. at 884.  For a discussion of System Justification 
Theory in law and social justice, see Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, supra note 166, at 1144-62. 
 169. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory, supra note 166, at 888. 
 170. Id. at 884.   
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measures, including self-esteem and neuroticism.171  The researchers 
hypothesized that the more members of high status social groups (i.e. 
European Americans) opposed equality (thus reinforcing their own 
dominance), the higher their self-esteem (and the lesser their 
neuroticism) would be.172  Their study of several hundred participants 
confirmed this hypothesis.173  The more that European American 
participants opposed equality, the greater their self-esteem was.174  
Similarly, the more the European American participants opposed 
equality, the less their neuroticism was.175  This result shows that people 
may continue to perpetuate inequality (and continued racial and 
economic subordination) as psychological self-enhancement (seeking 
higher self-esteem and lower neuroticism), much as people display the 
hindsight bias and endowment effect for a similar psychological reason.   
SJT also shows how the powerful cognitive forces underlying high 
status groups’ opposition to equality may fail to be countered by equal 
and opposite resistance by members of low status groups.176  In a study 
investigating how the desire to maintain social order may influence 
implicit attitudes, Laurie Rudman and her colleagues examined how less 
favored minority group members may actually implicitly (versus 
explicitly) support own-group subordination.177  They found that 
members of less-favored minority groups (such as overweight people 
and poor people) implicitly preferred more favored minority groups 
(such as Asians and Jews) to their own groups, but that these preferences 
only operated implicitly.178  The results indicated that the lower the 
 
 171. Jon T. Jost & Eric P. Thompson, Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to Equality as 
Independent Predictors of Self-Esteem, Ethnocentrism, and Social Policy Attitudes among African 
Americans and European Americans, 36 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 209 (2000).  The researchers 
measured opposition to equality using half of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale developed by 
Felicia Pratto and her colleagues.  Felicia Pratto et al., Social Dominance Orientation:  A 
Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 741, 742 (1994).   For example, participants were asked to rate their agreement with the 
following statements:  “Increased social equality would be a good thing,” and “[w]e would have 
fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.”  Jost & Thompson, supra note 166, at 
216.  For more on Social Dominance Orientation, see Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra 
note 4, at 361-62; JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE:  AN INTERGROUP 
THEORY OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999) (for a discussion on social dominance 
theory). 
 172. Jost & Thompson, supra note 171, at 213. 
 173. Id. at 217-18. 
 174. Id. at 229.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Laurie A. Rudman et al., supra note 166, at 294. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 312. 
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cultural status of the group, the more likely the members of that group 
would demonstrate “automatic ingroup devaluation.”179  This research 
suggests that although people may act or speak out (explicitly) to reject 
social ordering of preferred groups, they may also possess implicit 
motivation to maintain social and cultural hierarchies, even when it 
means disfavoring their own group.  This implicit motivation to maintain 
hierarchies may result in biased economic decision-making by 
consumers and service providers alike.  
B. Implicit Bias Leads to Economic Discrimination 
Within the context of economic discrimination, implicit bias 
scholarship predicts that conscious and unconscious psychological 
factors will combine to perpetuate inequality.  Several examples of 
documented economic discrimination, both in the real world and the 
laboratory, help demonstrate how implicit bias, amplified by people’s 
implicit need to maintain the social and racial status quo, may be 
functioning in hidden yet powerful ways that skew a variety of economic 
decisions.   
1. Discrimination in Real World Studies 
Studies of real world discrimination provide one domain in which 
racial stereotypes may overpower economic rationality.  Several studies 
of economic decision-making have shown the ways racial disparities 
may be propagated.  In one such study, 180 Ian Ayres and Peter 
Siegelman sent pairs of trained “testers” to negotiate the purchase of a 
car at over two hundred randomly selected car dealerships in the 
Chicago area.181  The testers were trained to bargain uniformly, such that 
the only meaningful difference between the testers was designed to be 
their race, gender, or both.182  Once a dealership was selected randomly, 
the researchers assigned a pair of testers to that dealership.183  The 
researchers measured the first offer made by the dealer as well as the 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE 20 (2001). 
 181. Id.   
 182. The researchers attempted to minimize other potential confounds.  For example, all testers 
were approximately the same age, had attained the same level of education, dressed similarly, and 
indicated that they could self-finance the automobile purchase.  Id. at 26. 
  The particular testers were selected randomly.  Id. at 23.  The testers included white 
males, black males, white females, or black females.  Id.  For each dealership selected, two testers 
were sent, one of which was always a white male.  The order in which the testers went to the 
dealership was determined randomly.  Id. at 24. 
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subsequent offers made by the dealers during the course of 
negotiations.184  Ayers and Siegelman found significant discrimination in 
the bargaining process.  Car dealers made more favorable offers to white 
men and made worse offers to black women, white women, and black 
men.185  In particular, dealers tended to demand the highest prices of 
black men, averaging about one thousand dollars per vehicle more than 
white men.186   
Researchers have found similar results in other economic domains, 
such as in the employment sector.  In a real world study of hiring 
decisions, Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan responded to 
job postings in Boston and Atlanta using resumes they created.187  The 
fictitious resumes contained candidate biographies with varying levels of 
experience, with some given “White sounding names” (e.g. Emily, 
Greg) and others given “African American sounding names” (e.g. 
Lakisha, Jamal).188  When they measured the number of phone calls 
employers made offering interviews to the job “candidates,” the 
researchers found that employers were more likely to call candidates 
with white sounding names than candidates with black sounding 
names.189  Furthermore, when accounting for both experience level and 
the candidate names, they found that having a white sounding name was 
equivalent to an additional eight years of experience.190 
In another study targeted directly at measuring economic 
discrimination in the legal system, Ayres and Joel Waldfogel examined 
whether discrimination against blacks operated in judges’ bail setting 
practices.191  Previous research in this area had indicated that judges 
indeed required higher bail for black defendants, but in those studies it 
could not entirely be ruled out that the black defendants could have been 
a higher flight risk.192  As a result, the researchers looked at a unique 
 
 184. Id. at 26. 
 185. Id. at 32. 
 186. Id.  Black males were asked to pay $962 more than white males on initial offers and 
$1,133 more on final offers, compared to white males.  Id.  
 187. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 
991 (2004). 
 188. Id. at 992. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 998. 
 191. AYRES, supra note 180. 
 192. Ayres and Waldfogel reminded readers that the purpose of the bail amount is to set it “at 
the smallest amount that will ‘reasonably assure the appearance of the arrested person in court.’”  
Id. at 235 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-64a (West 1985 & West Supp. 1993).      
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data set, bail bonds fees, to resolve the issue of flight risk.193  Because 
bail bonds fees are set specifically as a percentage of the chance of flight 
risk, and because the bail bonds industry functions well enough to be 
considered a market that conveys information, it became possible to 
compare whether judges’ bail amounts for white and black defendants 
(driven by their assumptions of flight risk) are similar to the actual bail 
bonds fees (similarly driven by an analysis of flight risk).  Ayers and 
Walfogel found that black defendants were indeed given higher bail 
amounts for the same crimes as white defendants, yet were charged 
significantly less by bail bondsman.194  The researchers contended that 
such a finding indicates that judges are erroneously setting bail too high 
for black males, far in excess of actual flight risk.195   
Ayres and his colleagues’ later studied whether economic 
discrimination similarly manifests in an everyday form—how much taxi 
riders tip their drivers. 196  One main difference between studying tipping 
and studying bargaining for the purchase of a new car, for example, is 
that in auto sales negotiations, the service provider has the most control, 
whereas in a taxi, the customer makes the decision to tip.197  Finding 
discrimination, therefore, would indicate that economic discrimination is 
not limited to corporate style discrimination.  To measure tipping on a 
large scale, the researchers asked twelve taxi drivers in New Haven, 
Connecticut to keep a detailed log of their fares and tips over a two 
month period.198  Six of the drivers were black, four were white, and two 
were non-white minorities.199  When the tips were tallied, the researchers 
found that customers tipped white drivers over sixty percent more than 
they tipped black drivers or other minority drivers.200  Furthermore, the 
researchers found that black drivers were 80% more likely to be 
“stiffed” (given no tip at all) than white drivers.201   
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice:  Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1613 (2005). 
 197. Id. at 1619.  
 198. Id. at 1623.  Every time a driver completed a fare, that driver was instructed to complete a 
survey regarding that fare.  Drivers were paid one dollar for every survey they completed.  Id. at 
1624. 
 199. Id. at 1623.  
 200. Id. at 1627.  Specifically, the white drivers were tipped 61 percent more than black drivers 
and 64 percent more than the other minority drivers.  Id. 
 201. Id.  The other minority drivers were even more likely to be “stiffed” (131% more likely).  
Id.  
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/4
10- LEVINSON_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:39 PM 
2012] SUPERBIAS 627 
Considering the compelling results of the studies outlined, it could 
be hypothesized that implicit racial bias, supported by people’s implicit 
need to maintain the social and racial status quo, might be driving the 
studies’ findings.  Although the studies’ methods did not leave room to 
test this hypothesis empirically, other researchers have begun to use 
similar methods to measure whether economic discrimination may be 
predicted by implicit biases.  In a real world study on hiring 
discrimination, for example, Dan-Olof Rooth sent resumes in response 
to real job postings and measured the number of job interviews given to 
fictitious candidates with either Arab-Muslim or Caucasian-Swedish 
sounding names.202  This study built on the previous work of Bertrand 
and Mullainathan by measuring not just interview invitations by 
employers, but also by testing the role of implicit bias in making these 
decisions.  To that end, he tracked down the actual human resources 
officers who had invited (or not invited) candidates to interview for jobs 
and convinced them to take a series of IATs.203  The results of the study 
confirmed that implicit bias predicted the HR officers’ decisions.204  
Those who harbored more implicit bias were less likely to call 
candidates with Arab-Muslim sounding names.205  Jens Agerstrom and 
Rooth conducted a similar study relating to obese and non-obese job 
candidates.206  Using photographs submitted with resumes, the 
researchers tested how HR officers would react to obese job candidates.  
They found first, that the HR officers discriminated against the obese 
candidates and, just as in Rooth’s previous study, this discrimination 
was predicted by the HR officers’ implicit biases.207  Although these 
studies do not conclusively prove that the discrimination shown by 
Ayres and others was driven by implicit racial bias, it certainly raises 
that possibility by showing that implicit bias can indeed affect real world 
economic decision-making. 
2. Discrimination in the Laboratory 
Economic game studies, which are heavily relied upon in crafting 
economic theory and are widely used in behavioral economics, have 
 
 202. See Rooth, supra note 138. 
 203. The participants were not aware of the purpose of the research project, and were paid for 
their participation.  Id. at 6. 
 204. Id. at 17. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Jens Agerstrom & Dan-Olof Rooth, The Role of Automatic Obesity Stereotypes in Real 
Hiring Discrimination, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 790 (2011). 
 207. Id. at 796-97. 
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similarly revealed interesting race-based differences in economic 
decision-making, but have rarely investigated the role of implicit bias.208  
In one such study, Catherine Eckel and Rick Wilson employed a “Trust 
Game” in which they examined how study participants’ economic trust 
would be affected by race, among other factors.209  Participants were 
given ten dollars210 that they could either keep or “loan” to their 
counterpart, who was profiled and pictured on their computer screen.211  
If the participants “loaned” the money to their counterpart, the money 
would be doubled and their counterpart would decide how to divide it 
between the two of them.  Interestingly, 82.9% of the participants loaned 
the money when they had a white counterpart, but only 57.1% loaned the 
money to an African American counterpart.212 
A later trust game conducted by Eckel and Ragan Petrie gave 
participants the opportunity to see a photo of their trust game partner.213  
The study, just as in the previous experiment, afforded participants the 
opportunity to send money to a partner (in this case, sending one “token” 
turned that one token into three tokens), who would in turn be able to 
keep some of the tokens and send some back.214  The results of the study 
showed that when white participants played the trust game with a black 
partner, they sent only 3.6 game tokens (of ten possible) to their partner, 
whereas when paired with a white partner, they sent 5.5 tokens.215  Black 
participants did not give more to black partners, and in fact gave more 
tokens to white partners, although this trend was not statistically 
significant.216  The researchers also found that white responders returned 
more tokens to generous white senders than to generous black senders.217   
 
 208. It should be noted that of the thousands of published studies on economic games, it is 
extremely rare to find studies examining resource allocation and race, ethnicity, or gender. 
 209.  See generally Eckel & Wilson, supra note 165. 
 210. Id.  Dollars in the experiment could be converted to actual US dollars at the rate of two 
experimental dollars to one US dollar. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Due to the small number of trials in which participants were asked to lend to African 
American counterparts, this result was of marginal statistical significance.  Id. at 10. 
 213. Eckel & Petrie, supra note 165.  Participants had to “pay” a small amount of their token 
wealth in order to see the photo.  Id. at 3.  Thus, the researchers accrued data for participants who 
saw a photo of their partner and participants who did not see a photo of their partner.  It should be 
noted that the researchers employed the study at a racially diverse university with approximately 
54.8% black participants and 26.2% white participants.  Id. at 4. 
 214. Id. at 3.  
 215. Id. at 7.  This result was reported to be statistically significant. 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. at 10.  
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Another type of economic game, a “dictator game,”218 conducted 
by Christina Fong and Erzo Luttmer, tested whether people’s charitable 
giving would be predicted by their perceptions of the race of the 
charity’s beneficiaries (as well as the worthiness of the beneficiaries).219  
One thousand adult participants were told that there was a 10% chance 
that they would receive one hundred dollars and were asked whether 
they would give some of that money, if they won it, to a described 
charity.220  The charity was then described and the participants saw 
photos of the beneficiaries of the charity’s services.221  The researchers 
found that when white participants saw photos of black beneficiaries, 
these participants rated the beneficiaries as less worthy; this decreased 
worthiness predicted a decrease in the amount that the participants 
agreed to give to the charity.222   
These studies demonstrate that economic discrimination is real, and 
that it occurs in a variety of real world and laboratory settings.  But they 
did not investigate whether the discriminatory economic allocations 
were connected to people’s implicit need to maintain the social and 
racial status quo.  One study, however, directly tested whether implicit 
racial bias predicts economic discrimination in a game-like setting.  In 
this experiment, Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore informed student 
participants that economic conditions made it necessary to make budget 
cuts to student organizations, and asked the students to make specific 
recommendations.223  They then separately measured those participants’ 
implicit biases.224  The study showed that the more implicit bias the 
students harbored toward a group (e.g. Jews, blacks, or Asians), the 
more likely those students were to cut the budgets of related student 
organizations.225  This study shows that implicit racial bias predicts the 
 
 218. The “dictator game” is described supra note 164. 
 219. Christina M. Fong & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, Do Fairness and Race Matter in Generosity?  
Evidence from a Nationally Representative Charity Experiment, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 372 (2011). 
 220. Id. at 3-4.  
 221. Id. at 6. 
 222. Id. at 20.  Interestingly, the race of the beneficiaries alone did not affect participant 
judgments.  Instead, the race affects were caused by decreased ratings of worthiness of pictured 
black beneficiaries.  According to the researchers, this finding “is consistent with [the] argument 
that ‘racially biased social cognition,’ rather than a taste for discrimination, accounts for racial 
inequality.  [The] findings are also consistent with prior research showing that racially biased 
attitudes regarding welfare for the poor are driven by whites’ beliefs that blacks are morally 
unworthy of support—e.g., that blacks are lazy and that they abuse welfare.”  Id. at 5 (citing G. 
LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002); M. GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE 
WELFARE (1999)). 
 223. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 132, at 365.  
 224. Id. at 364-65. 
 225. Id. at 367-68.  
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way resources may be allocated, and did so in a way that conflicted with 
participants self reported attitudes (participants, when asked explicitly, 
did not purport to harbor bias towards Jews, blacks, or Asians).226  It 
could be predicted, then, that the economic discrimination found by 
Eckel and others might be driven by implicit racial bias. 
Despite this prediction, scholars have largely explained the 
discriminatory results of the economic studies by assuming that people 
hold conscious reasons for their discriminatory behavior.  For example, 
Ayres and his colleagues noted, in the taxicab tipping study, “the higher 
propensity of passengers to stiff black drivers seems more consistent 
with a theory of conscious decisionmaking.”227  Rachel Moran similarly 
relies on conscious factors to explain Ayres’ automobile bargaining 
results, but explains the discrimination somewhat differently: 
Dealers expect White men to know more and bargain harder . . .  As a 
result, the higher prices offered to women, whether Black or White, 
reflect statistical discrimination, a belief that they are easy marks for 
generating extra profit.  By contrast, the notably higher price 
demanded from Black men is based on both statistical discrimination 
(the belief that this is a sucker) and consequential animus (a desire to 
keep the sucker in his place).228   
Thus, Moran’s description relies on a combination of statistical 
discrimination (in which people discriminate to make a profit) and racial 
animus to explain the results.   
However, there is little evidence that such systematic bias can only 
be accounted for by referencing people’s conscious decisions.  Although 
conscious discrimination undoubtedly exists and can affect all kinds of 
decision-making, it is unlikely that either statistical discrimination or 
race based animus explains all of the racial disparities revealed by the 
studies.229  As the reported research shows, the more likely scenario is 
that implicit racial bias, amplified by System Justification Theory, 
causes people to take economic action that perpetuates existing 
 
 226. Id. at 368.  
 227. Ayres et al., supra note 197, at 1617.  Ayres and his colleagues explain further:  “This 
does not mean that passengers were consciously stiffing based upon the cab driver’s race, but it does 
suggest that conscious decisionmaking of some kind was at work.”  Id. at 1654. 
 228. Rachel Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 904 (2005).  
Moran recognizes many of the negative consequences of this type of economic justification:  “The 
racial disparities that result are considered unintended rather than malicious, a byproduct of the 
predominance of same-race families, friendships, and neighborhoods.”  Id. at 905. 
 229. For example, Ayres and his colleagues did note that riders’ propensity to “round” up their 
tips more frequently to white drivers was likely “unconscious” in nature.  Ayres et al., supra note 
196, at 1618. 
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hierarchies.  Framed in a SJT lens, then, this section next examines how 
implicit racial bias could potentially interfere with specific behavioral 
economic principles in certain situations.   
C. The Collision:  Overpowering Behavioral Economic Phenomena 
Implicit racial bias, amplified by SJT, has the potential to interfere 
with behavioral economic phenomena in racially stereotyped ways.  
Consider the endowment effect, for example.  If someone receives a 
lottery ticket worth five dollars, it might take ten or more dollars to buy 
the ticket from that person.230  The person’s need to receive close to ten 
dollars serves an important self-related function that overpowers the 
economic function of rationally increasing actual wealth.  Thus, people 
will forego money so long as there is sufficient psychological (plus 
economic) value associated with possessing an item.  In the case of the 
lottery ticket, the psychological value attached to it is largely due to the 
holder’s artificially inflated estimate that the ticket will end up a winner.  
The artificial inflation itself, however, is due to the possessor’s largely 
unconscious need to feel better about the situation.   
1. The SuperBias Endowment Effect 
But what happens to the endowment effect when, as in the real 
world, race, ethnicity, class, gender, and other factors become part of the 
economic mix?  From an economic perspective, if the lottery ticket 
owner is offered eight dollars for the ticket worth five dollars, the owner 
should take the deal.  The racial identity of the offering party is clearly 
irrelevant.  Yet if owners accept eight dollar offers from in-group 
members (say, a European American male) and reject identical offers 
from out-group members (say, an African American male), how would 
we explain that decision?  Would we, as Ayres’ studies have sometimes 
been constructed, believe that conscious animus towards African 
American males drives us to intentionally demand more before shifting 
resources to them?  Perhaps, but SJT allows us to consider that the 
endowment effect becomes malleable because, on top of the baseline 
implicit need to feel better about the situation, there are other implicit 
cognitive demands (which economists would similarly deem 
“irrational”) on the ticket owner.   
 
 230. The real numbers supported by endowment effect are not so “round.”  For detailed results 
of a similar lottery ticket study, see Knetsh & Sinden, supra note 84.  
41
Levinson: SuperBias
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
10- LEVINSON_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:39 PM 
632 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:591 
These additional implicit needs are similarly inconsistent with 
economic self-interest, but are instead consistent with SJT:  first, 
securing a greater amount of wealth from an out-group member (if, 
indeed the out-group member chooses to buy at such a high price) serves 
to shift economic resources only in a windfall economic situation, and 
second, transferring assets only at above market prices to lower status 
group members helps bolster the self-esteem of the higher status group.  
Neither of these SJT consistent rationales would hold true if the 
transaction occurred at the five dollar economic value of the ticket.  If a 
transaction occurs at ten dollars, for example, the ticket has shifted 
hands, but at a steep cost to the buyer (an economic loss of five dollars).  
In this situation, it is indeed irrational for the seller to hold out for such a 
high price, but the collective entity (European American males in such a 
market) benefits (in terms of status quo maintenance, at least) from the 
individual’s seemingly irrational decision.  Thus, the seller’s 
irrationality, presumed by the endowment effect to be part of implicit 
self-esteem maintenance, has added racial status quo maintenance as a 
new esteem-related goal, and perhaps has done so even without the 
seller’s conscious awareness.   
Similarly, the heightened race-based irrationality of the transaction 
may have been exacerbated by the buyer’s unconscious complicity.  If, 
as Rudman and colleagues’ study demonstrates, lower status members 
also harbor implicit needs to maintain the hierarchy of the status quo, the 
buyer’s seemingly irrational decision to spend so much could similarly 
be explained.  Thus, a racially irrational transaction occurs because of 
the power of implicit bias (and system justification) on both buyers and 
sellers.   
The economic discrimination found in Ayres and Siegelman’s 
study of automobile pricing could be in part due to what happens when 
endowment effect meets implicit racial bias.  Consider why a car 
salesperson would choose to ask, for example, $1,000 more from black 
male compared to white male shoppers.  Although Ayers and colleagues 
gave several possibilities for this result, one additional possibility could 
be related to implicit racial bias and the endowment effect.  Car 
dealerships act as owners of the cars.  In a typical situation, due to the 
compelling business reasons that would require familiarity with the 
value of their fleet, one would not expect that car dealers would 
subjectively overvalue the worth of their cars.  But endowment effect 
would certainly make this a possibility, as in the case of a used car 
market, for example.  In the classic car bargaining scenario, car dealers’ 
endowment effect, if any, would be countered by consistently lower 
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purchaser offers, offers that would reflect close to the true market value 
of the cars.  Thus, if the dealers wanted to sell cars, more often than not 
they would have to accept an offer closer to the true economic value of 
the car.  Their business would fail, otherwise.   
So why might things be different in the case of black buyers?  As 
SJT and the above discussion suggest, dealers may have dual implicit 
needs that arise and trump the original endowment effect:  first, the 
implicit need to maintain the racial status quo, and second, the need to 
maintain self-esteem.  In formulating a first offer price, and again as 
negotiations proceed, dealers possessing these powerful implicit needs 
will find it harder to adjust to market offers.  Moreover, market factors 
may play a role.  To the extent that many or even most dealers ask for 
more money from black buyers, then the buyers’ reaction to the 
artificially inflated market may not allow for a successful bargaining 
session that would result in a purchase price that is equal to the true 
economic value.  Instead, the artificially high prices may cause black 
buyers to have to purchase the cars at higher prices.  Although 
technology presumably helps all buyers obtain competitive prices in 
today’s information-filled marketplace, it is still possible that price 
disparities will result.  
2. The SuperBias Anchoring Effect 
Like the endowment effect, other behavioral economic phenomena 
may similarly yield to an implicit need to maintain the social and racial 
status quo.  The anchoring effect, for example, has been shown to affect 
jurors’ judgments of damages.231  When jurors are exposed to 
irrationally high requests for damages, they are unable to fully disregard 
the anchor when they determine damages.232  Beginning at the high 
anchor and adjusting downwards, the jurors finally select a number 
when the dollar value in their mind comports with legitimate examples 
or memories they can retrieve.  But is such an adjustment possible 
without bias when race becomes introduced?  Here, resulting biases are 
likely magnified not so much by SJT as by the effect of racial 
stereotypes.  
Imagine that a pedestrian brings suit after being injured by faulty 
machinery while walking past a construction site.  If the victim-plaintiff 
is white, a juror’s mental search in response to a high anchor proposed 
 
 231. See Tor, supra note 1, at 252-53. 
 232. Id. at 252 (citing EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES:  THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 152-54 (2003)). 
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by counsel may proceed differently than if the victim-plaintiff is black.  
Specifically, when considering potential damages in response to the high 
anchor proposed, the juror’s mental search will yield more cognitive 
“hits.”  This result can be explained because it is common for a black 
male to be stereotyped as poor and lazy.233  So long as the jurors are 
aware of this stereotype, even if they do not consciously embrace it, their 
downwards adjustment to the plaintiff’s high anchor may continue for 
the black plaintiff long after they would have settled on a reasonable 
adjustment for an otherwise identical white plaintiff.  In the case of low 
anchors (offered by the defense attorney), it will conversely be easier for 
the jurors to find a cognitive representation closer to the low anchor 
when the plaintiff is black.  Here, simply embracing the contents of 
one’s own mind (which contain stereotypic representations of reality) 
allows for a black plaintiff to be harmed through implicit racial bias in 
anchoring effect.       
Racial stereotype influenced anchoring could also help to explain 
documented racial disparities.  The economic bias found in Ayres and 
Waldfogel’s study of bail setting, for example, could be due to racial 
stereotype affects on anchoring.  Assuming, arguendo, that prosecutor 
requests for bail are equal for defendants in similar situations, bail 
discrepancies might be traced to judges’ failure to adjust anchors 
sufficiently.  For example, judges may make stereotype influenced 
judgments of flight risk that can corrupt the anchoring adjustment 
process.  To the extent that judges hold (even implicit or unconscious) 
stereotypes of black male defendants as being non-trustworthy and 
immoral, stereotype-consistent memories will prove more accessible 
than if the same defendants were white.  Thus, in making a particular 
bail setting decision, a judge may have an easier time recalling a 
supposedly similar black male who was a genuine flight risk than an 
analogous white male who was a flight risk.  Such memory-driven 
stereotypes could account for the real-world bail setting discrepancies 
found by Ayres and Waldfogel. 
 
 233. Results of the black-white stereotype IAT consistently show that people associate black 
with traits such as lazy and hostile, and whites with traits such as ambitious and calm.  See, e.g., 
Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 132, at 361; Brian Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group 
Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 102 (2002) 
(reporting results from six hundred thousand IATs on the popular online website, including 
significant Black-White IAT results).  
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3. The SuperBias Hindsight Bias 
As described in section II, hindsight bias describes the phenomenon 
whereby people overestimate the likelihood that an event would occur 
when they already know the outcome of that event.  Hindsight bias 
occurs largely because of self-esteem reasons.  Essentially, people’s 
need to believe that they are wise (and, given relevant information, 
would be able to predict the outcome of an event) causes them to revise 
history such that they can claim to “know it all along.”   
But how does people’s implicit need to feel wise compare with 
people’s implicit need to maintain the social and racial status quo?  It is 
quite possible that a psychological need to enhance the in-group and 
maintain the status quo might overpower the temporary need to feel 
wise.  After all, status quo maintenance is potentially a more 
economically important and longer-term proposition than is the implicit 
need to feel wise.  Imagine a situation, for example, in which people are 
asked to identify the likelihood that a victim who was shot in the 
stomach would have died.  In the situation in which the victim has 
indeed died from the gunshot wound, one would not expect to see any 
hindsight bias differences based on the perpetrator’s race.  After all, the 
hindsight information of the victim dying from the wound is consistent 
with the stereotype of an aggressive killer inflicting a mortal wound.  
Yet, in the situation in which the victim survives, the simple fact that 
people stereotype black males as aggressive killers could lead to an 
altered evaluation in one of these situations.  One could predict that the 
aggressive stereotype of the perpetrator would lead people to partially 
forget the real outcome (the victim lived) and overstate the victim’s 
chances of dying.        
A 1990 study by Galen Bodenhausen examined what happens when 
the hindsight bias meets stereotypes.234  Participants in the study read 
one of two descriptions of a crime, either an alleged sexual assault by a 
high school teacher of a student, or a violent assualt.235  For the violent 
assault, participants read about an alleged assailant named either Robert 
Garner or Roberto Garcia. For the sexual assault, participants read about 
a male teacher sexually assaulting either a male student or female 
student.236  Thus, regardless of the case they read, participants either 
read about a crime committed by a stereotyped offender (e.g. Hispanic 
for one; homosexual for the other) or a non-stereotyped offender 
 
 234. See Bodenhausen, supra note 5.  
 235. Id. at 1115.  
 236. Id. 
45
Levinson: SuperBias
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
10- LEVINSON_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:39 PM 
636 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:591 
(Caucasian for one; heterosexual for the other).  At the end of the crime 
descriptions, participants were told that the defendant was either found 
guilty or not guilty.237  Thus, they were given information that should 
trigger hindsight bias if later asked to provide their personal estimation 
of whether the defendant was guilty or not.  When participants were later 
asked whether the defendant should be convicted for the crime, 
Bodenhausen found that the participants displayed the expected 
hindsight bias when non-stereotyped offenders were described, or in 
cases in which the defendants had been found guilty.238  But in cases in 
which stereotyped defendants had been found not guilty, participants did 
not display the hindsight bias and instead predicted that the defendant 
would be found guilty.239  Thus, the study showed that crime related 
stereotypes of perpetrators overpowered hindsight bias.  In light of its 
fascinating findings, it is somewhat surprising that the study has not 
been replicated or modified in a modern racial climate, which many 
claim to be significantly different than in 1990.240  Similarly, researchers 
have not examined what happens when other behavioral economic 
phenomena clash with racial stereotypes.241 
Building on the several theoretical reasons for exploring the 
intersection of behavioral economic principles and implicit racial bias, as 
well as on Bodenhausen’s 1990 study, I conducted an empirical study 
designed to test what happens when racial stereotypes and behavioral 
economics collide.  
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1116.  
 239. Id. at 1117. 
 240. See generally Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 
(2010); Camille A. Nelson, Racial Paradox and Eclipse:  Obama as a Balm for What Ails Us, 86 
DENV. U. L. REV. 743 (2009); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Johanna Wald, After Shirley Sherrod, We 
All Need to Slow Down and Listen, WASH. POST, July 25, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/23/ AR2010072304583.html; 
Kathleen Schmidt & Brian A. Nosek, Implicit (and Explicit) Racial Attitudes Barely Changed 
During Barack Obama’s Presidential Campaign and Early Presidency, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 308 (2010) (showing psychological evidence that President Obama’s rise to the 
presidency did little to change implicit racial bias).  In addition, it would be important to test this 
phenomenon for a hindsight measure other than guilty/ not guilty, as it is conceivable that the 
participants’ judgments were skewed by their beliefs that juries might be biased. 
 241. The SuperBias discussions in the text regarding anchoring effects, endowment effect, and 
status quo bias would be good places to start.  Other behavioral economic phenomena, though not 
discussed at length here, would similarly make good targets for empirical study.  The phenomenon 
of loss aversion generally, exemplified by framing effects, for example, might yield interesting 
results.  Framing effects refers to the concept that people place more value on items that are lost 
rather than found.  Applying implicit bias and SJT to framing effects could reveal that higher status 
group members will be more averse to losing things when it ends up in hands of subordinated 
group.   
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/4
10- LEVINSON_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:39 PM 
2012] SUPERBIAS 637 
IV.  THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
In order to test the collision of racial stereotypes and economic-
based cognitive biases, I designed and conducted an empirical study.  
This section reports on the details of study, including the research 
methods, study materials, and results.  The study was based on a 
criminal trial vignette that simultaneously exposed participants to cues 
that would be expected to trigger both hindsight bias and anchoring 
effects.  In addition to the behavioral economic cues, the race of the 
defendant was varied, such that half of the trials described an African 
American defendant and the other half described a Caucasian defendant.  
Based upon the similar cognitive mechanisms underlying behavioral 
economics and implicit racial bias, as well as the powerful nature of 
aggressive black male racial stereotypes, I hypothesized that when the 
defendant was Caucasian, participants would display the expected 
hindsight bias and anchoring effects; and when the defendant was 
African American, participants would display diminished or otherwise 
altered cognitive biases.242   
A. Methods and Materials 
Participants were 217 undergraduate students at a major research 
university who participated for extra credit.  The mean participant age 
was 20.48 years.  Fifty nine percent of the participants were female.  
There was considerable ethnic diversity among the participants.  Thirty-
nine percent of the participants identified themselves as Asian or Asian 
American,243 twenty-four percent of the participants identified 
themselves as Caucasian, four percent identified themselves as Pacific 
Islander, seven percent identified themselves as Native Hawaiian, three 
percent identified themselves as Latino/Hispanic, and ten percent 
identified themselves as “other.”244   
Participants were told to imagine that they were jurors in a criminal 
trial.  They then read the following description of the case:245 
Tyronne, a 23 year old African American man, first encountered 
James, a 30 year old plumber, when they accidentally bumped elbows 
 
 242. See Bodenhausen, supra note 5.   
 243. Of these participants, thirty-eight identified themselves as Japanese American, seventeen 
identified themselves as Chinese American, and seven identified themselves as Korean American.  
Fifteen marked “other” Asian American, which included Filipino. 
 244. Some participants did not report their ethnicity. 
 245. The vignette was a modified version of the fact pattern used by Levinson, Forgotten 
Racial Equality, supra note 4. 
47
Levinson: SuperBias
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
10- LEVINSON_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:39 PM 
638 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:591 
in a crowded bar.  In the accident, James spilled beer onto Tyronne’s 
shirt and shorts.  Tyronne was visibly angry but the encounter ended 
when a bar employee took him by the arm and led him away.  As 
Tyronne walked away with the bar employee, James smiled at Tyronne 
and chuckled.  An hour after leaving the bar, Tyronne and a friend 
spotted James outside a local diner.  They approached James slowly, 
and Tyronne said:  “Why did you bump into me back there?”  James 
said nothing and just looked down.  Tyronne and his friend moved 
closer to James and Tyronne repeated his question.  James said:  “You 
don’t handle your liquor too well.  Get out of my face.”  Without 
hesitating, Tyronne then punched James in the face.  James fell back.  
He then turned around, took a couple steps away from Tyronne, and 
appeared to reach for something in his pocket.  Tyronne quickly 
grabbed his gun, and just as James turned around, Tyronne shot him 
once in the stomach.  James immediately fell to the ground.  Tyronne 
and his friend then walked away quickly and quietly. 
 When the police and ambulance arrived 15 minutes later, James was 
barely alive.  He was pronounced dead upon arriving at the hospital. 
 An eyewitness description of Tyronne led police to arrest him two 
hours later.  The gun was found in a dumpster outside of his apartment.  
The prosecution has charged Tyronne with murder. 
B. Measures 
The case information allowed for three variables to be tested:  
hindsight, anchor, and race of perpetrator.  The study was designed as a 
“between-subjects” study, such that participants in different conditions 
read a different version of the study.246  The hindsight and race 
experimental conditions were varied in the text of the case, while the 
anchoring experimental condition was varied in the questions posed after 
the case.   
1. Hindsight condition 
In the hindsight condition, half of the participants (those in the 
“died condition”) read that James was “pronounced dead upon arriving 
at the hospital.”  The other half (those in the “survived condition”) read 
that “[a]fter a two hour surgical procedure, his condition improved and 
he was expected to survive.”  Hindsight bias would predict that 
participants in the “died condition” (those who read about a victim that 
died from the gunshot wound), when asked how likely it was that the 
 
 246. Thus there were eight different possible versions that participants could receive. 
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victim’s injuries would result in death, would be more likely than 
participants in the “survived condition” to estimate that the gunshot 
would be fatal.   
2. Anchoring condition 
Anchoring was varied in the questions following the case.  The 
anchor was set by asking the participants to complete following 
question:  “In the state of Hawaii, the minimum jail sentence for 
attempted murder247 is shorter/longer (circle one) than __ years.”  Half 
of the participants were asked whether the sentence is shorter/longer 
than 10 years (the “short anchor”), and half were asked whether the 
sentence is shorter/longer than 25 years (the “long anchor”).  The 
participants were then asked “how long do you think the minimum jail 
sentence is for attempted murder?”248  The science underlying anchoring 
effects would predict that, because they would selectively retrieve 
memories related to the length of the anchor, participants in the “short 
anchor” condition would select a shorter minimum jail sentence 
compared to participants in the “long anchor” condition.  In addition to 
being asked about the law’s minimum jail sentence, participants were 
asked how long they thought the minimum jail sentence should be. 
3. Race condition 
Finally, for the race condition, half of the participants read about 
William, who was identified as a Caucasian man, and the other half read 
about Tyronne, who was identified as an African American man.  This 
condition was designed so that the interaction of hindsight bias, 
anchoring effects, and racial stereotypes could be explored.     
C. Results 
Results were calculated using the statistical method of ANOVA.249 
1. Hindsight Bias 
The results confirmed that hindsight bias affected participants’ 
estimates of the mandatory minimum jail sentence.  As expected, 
 
 247. To maintain consistency, participants in the “died condition” were asked about the 
minimum jail sentence for murder rather than attempted murder. 
 248. Here again, participants in the “died condition” were asked about the minimum jail 
sentence for murder. 
 249. An ANOVA is a statistical analysis that tests the variance of participant responses. 
49
Levinson: SuperBias
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
10- LEVINSON_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:39 PM 
640 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:591 
participants in the “died condition” were more likely to believe that the 
victim would die of the gunshot wound (estimating the likelihood at 
76.4%) than participants in the “survived condition” (estimating the 
likelihood at 65.5%), F (1, 204) = 16.958, p<.001.  This result confirms 
that hindsight bias operates in legal decision-making250 and, in 
particular, indicates that participants were unable to disregard the 
outcome information that had been provided.   
2. Anchoring Affect 
The results confirmed that anchoring effects influenced 
participants’ judgments of minimum sentences for murder and attempted 
murder.  As predicted, participants in the short anchor condition believed 
that the minimum sentences were shorter than participants in the long 
anchor condition, F (1, 202) = 39.385, p<.001.  Specifically, participants 
given a 10 year anchor estimated that the minimum sentence was 11.4 
years, and participants given a 25 year anchor estimated that the 
minimum sentence was 19.1 years. 
3. Race Effects on Hindsight Bias 
As predicted, racial stereotypes served to blunt the hindsight bias.  
Participants in the white perpetrator condition displayed a stronger 
hindsight bias than participants in the black perpetrator condition, F (1, 
204) = 2.75, p<.05.251  Stated simply, when there was a black perpetrator 
and a victim who survived, participants displayed significantly less 
hindsight bias compared to when there was a white perpetrator.  
Participants who read about a black perpetrator estimated that the victim 
was 68.3% likely to die after a similar attack, while participants who 
read about a white perpetrator estimated that the victim was 62.7% likely 
to die.  There were lesser differences between participants in the black 
perpetrator condition and the white perpetrator condition when in the 
“died condition,” likely because in this condition there was no conflict 
between the outcome (death) and racial stereotypes of black 
aggression.252  Overall, participants in the white perpetrator condition 
displayed significant hindsight bias, F (1, 103) = 18.1, p<.001, while 
 
 250. Other empirical studies have found hindsight bias in legal decision-making.  See, e.g., 
Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 8. 
 251. A one-tailed p test was conducted because the specific directionality of the interaction, 
that the hindsight bias would be lessened in the attempted murder case, was being tested.   
 252. See Graph 1, infra Appendix A.  These results are consistent with the results in 
Bodenhausen’s study.  See Bodenhausen, supra note 5, at 1117. 
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participants in the black perpetrator condition displayed lesser, 
marginally significant, hindsight bias, F (1, 98) = 2.79, p = .097.    
4. Race Effects on Anchoring 
Racial stereotypes also appeared to somewhat blunt anchoring 
effects, but the effect was not of statistical significance.  It was 
hypothesized that, in the high anchor condition (in which participants 
were given a 25 year anchor), participants reading about a black 
perpetrator would display weaker anchoring effects due to race-relevant 
stereotypes relating to weak criminal sanctions.  Displaying a trend in 
the predicted direction, for participants in the high anchor condition, 
those who read about a black perpetrator believed that the average 
sentence for the crime was 17.78 years, whereas those who read about a 
white perpetrator believed that the average sentence for the crime was 
20.45 years.253  This difference in the numbers did not reach statistical 
significance. F (1,202) = 0.96 p>.10.  Stated simply, participants who 
read about a black perpetrator appeared to believe the mandatory 
sentence was shorter when given a long anchor.    
D. Limitations 
The study was designed as an initial investigation into what 
happens when racial stereotypes and cognitive biases collide.  There 
were several limitations of the study that should be addressed in future 
research.  First, the participant pool was limited to university students 
taking psychology courses.  The study participants may not have 
therefore been representative of a broader population.  Although a broad 
population is not crucial for initial studies seeking to identify a 
psychological phenomenon, it becomes more important as the 
phenomenon is retested and confirmed.  Second, the study tested how 
racial cues in a stereotype-consistent setting would interact with a 
cognitive bias.  Yet, because it was not confirmed that the study 
activated implicit racial stereotypes, it cannot be known whether the 
study tested implicit racial bias specifically, rather than stereotype-
consistent racial cues that were operating explicitly.  Future studies 
should therefore specifically test whether implicit racial biases were 
operating.  In addition, future studies should build on this study by 
expanding the phenomena that were tested.  As described in section III, 
 
 253. See Graph 2, infra Appendix A. 
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the endowment effect would be a perfect candidate for a laboratory type 
economic game featuring game partners from varying racial groups.   
V.  AN IMPLICIT BIAS MODEL OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS:  FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS AND LEGAL RESPONSES 
The results of the empirical study support the contention that racial 
stereotypes may trump or otherwise alter behavioral economic principles 
in certain circumstances.  Two primary areas of consideration arise in 
the study’s aftermath.  First, behavioral economic scholarship, and the 
behavioral model itself, must be reconsidered in light of racial 
stereotypes.  And second, a detailed empirical research agenda is needed 
in order to confirm how racial stereotypes function across a range of 
cognitive biases.  
A. Developing A Stereotype Competent Behavioral Economic Model 
Behavioral law and economics scholars should begin considering 
how to build a stereotype competent model of behavioral law and 
economics.  Specifically, a stereotype competent model must consider 
that, in addition to the implicit needs that drive traditional cognitive 
biases, people have an implicit need to maintain the status quo, and 
therefore deviations from rational economic decision-making may move 
in a direction that continues this subordination.  To date, however, 
scholars have been almost solely concerned with how human minds 
irrationally stray from economically beneficial decisions.  But if these 
minds do so in a predictably biased way whenever stereotypes are 
present, then a new model, coupled with new potential solutions, must 
be explored.  This exploration requires recognizing that very few 
economic transactions occur in the absence of stereotypes.  Although 
race may not be an issue in all economic decisions, if one factors in 
gender, age, disability, sexual preference, obesity, and religion, among 
others, and the stereotypes and implicit needs that come with these 
categories, it becomes clear that existing models require major updating.  
Such an updating would involve considering changes in what scholars 
have considered descriptive, prescriptive, and normative implications of 
behavioral economics.254  A brief look ahead, then, at the way a 
SuperBias would change the proposed responses to behavioral 
economics, would be warranted. 
 
 254. For more on these concepts, see Jolls et al., supra note 1. 
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A major question legal scholars will have to debate is the role of 
paternalism in reducing the race-skewed effects of behavioral economic 
principles. Scholars have had a difficult time agreeing upon how much 
intervention, if any, is desirable to facilitate the proper level of economic 
behavior.  A leading school of thought in this area, libertarian 
paternalism, holds that the law should implement careful interventions 
that improve economic outcomes but still allow for choice.255  It must be 
considered whether solutions that re-frame choices, for example, will 
ameliorate or perhaps exacerbate the race based effects of certain 
behavioral economic principles.  If anchors, frames, hindsight, or other 
effects are skewed in a racially unequal direction, then will existing 
proposed remedies such as hiding anchors, changing frames, or the like 
improve the problem or exacerbate it?  And will new remedies, perhaps 
those borrowed from “debiasing” studies in implicit social cognition,256 
provide additional avenues for an exploration of how to respond to 
irrationality?  It is likely that some potential responses will improve the 
problem, while others will make it worse.  The empirical answer to this 
question must therefore be pursued. 
B. An Empirical Future Research Agenda 
In addition to a reexamination of the behavioral economic model, a 
robust research program must continue to investigate the ways in which 
racial stereotypes modify or otherwise change behavioral economic 
findings.  The success of behavioral law and economics has largely been 
built upon powerful and consistent empirical findings.  This expansion 
of behavioral knowledge should be no different.  Backed by research 
funding, this effort should systematically examine what happens when 
racial stereotypes are present in a range of economic situations.  Here, I 
offer a basic suggestion for future empirical research that would provide 
a logical starting point. 
Studying the endowment effect in racial context would be a 
straightforward endeavor.  Researchers can specifically investigate 
whether endowment effects are strengthened when other market players 
are racial (or other) minorities, leading to maintenance of the social and 
racial status quo.  In order to conduct such a study, researchers could 
either simulate a trading market or they could conduct a live trading 
 
 255. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 74. 
 256. For more on debiasing, see, for example, Kang, supra note 4, at 1580; Kang & Banaji, 
supra note 4, at 1101-08; Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 4, at 406-17; Page, supra 
note 103, at 239. 
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market and follow it with implicit association tests.  In a simulated 
trading market, participants could be brought to a laboratory in small 
groups, seated at computers, and given (endowed) or not given certain 
objects, and asked to make an offer to sell or buy the object to or from a 
hypothetical partner.  The partner would be pictured on the computer 
screen, such that the partner’s race could be varied by the researchers 
using photographs that have been pre-tested for stereotypicality and 
attractiveness (or using face morphing software that is designed to avoid 
non-race differences in the faces).  Researchers could then measure the 
strength of the endowment effect.  It could be hypothesized that white 
participants will display stronger endowment effects when they are 
asked to transfer their endowed objects to non-white partners.  
Researchers could then give participants IATs in order to test whether 
implicit bias predicts these race-based economic decisions.  Another 
variation on the same computer-based study would be to avoid 
specifically showing participants photos of their partners, but to prime 
their partner’s race subliminally.  Studies have shown that study 
participants may guard against bias in their responses when they suspect 
a race-focused purpose of a study, and other projects have found that 
subliminal priming avoids this guarding.257  Researchers should 
therefore consider using both explicit racial priming through 
photographs as well as implicit subliminal priming methods. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Legal scholarship is in the midst of a sophisticated and fruitful 
updating of its model of human decision-making.  Recent decades have 
brought vast improvements to legal theory that have begun to recognize 
the true and complex nature of the human mind.  Yet for all the 
successes of this updating, it has not been perfect.  In the same way that 
other areas of scholarship have overlooked the role of race, culture, and 
inequality, behavioral economics has done the same.  It has assumed that 
even behavioral deviations from rationality are connected to a drive for 
individual self-enhancement and improvement that overlooks the role of 
powerful cultural and social forces on the human mind.  Fortunately, 
implicit social cognition research has separately brought to light many of 
the effects of these powerful forces.  This inequality-focused mind 
science has sent a powerful message to scholars concerned about racial 
 
 257. See Rachlinski et al, supra note 142, at 1232 (finding that implicit bias predicted judges’ 
discriminatory decisions when race was primed subliminally, but not when it was explicitly 
presented). 
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justice.  Yet the same message has been missed even by those who 
understand its sophisticated empirical research and statistical methods.  
With the embracing of a race-competent model of behavioral law and 
economics, scholars will be taking a major step in bringing an accurate 
and fair model of decision-making to the law. 
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